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INTRODUCTION

The United States' mandatory exclusionary rules are often
criticized as being "peculiar." 1 The criticism stems from the fact
that the evidence rules of other common law and civil law
countries do not contain similar provisions. Additionally, support
for the exclusionary rules is not unanimous. A U.S. Department
of Justice report attacked the exclusionary rules of the Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Amendments and urged the U.S. Supreme Court
to overrule them. 2 The report argued that the United States'
3
exclusionary rules have no basis in the traditional common law.
Until recently, the English courts adhered to the traditional
common law "reliability" and "voluntariness" tests for exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence. The U.S. Supreme Court discarded
these tests in the "criminal procedure revolution" of the 1960s.
Under the traditional common law, unlawfully obtained physical
evidence was "basically admissible subject to a rarely exercised
judicial discretion to exclude it ' 4 and "involuntary" confessions
were always excluded.
After 1984, however, the English criminal justice system
began a process of reconstruction. Following lengthy debates on
the criminal justice system and its traditional exclusionary rules, it
enacted the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) in 1984.
Under this new system of regulating the entire criminal process, the
English courts rigorously exercise their discretion to exclude tainted
evidence. Simultaneously, the law and order lobby successfully
abolished the right to silence via the Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act of 1994 (CJPOA). These two new legal frameworks of
criminal process created a new stage in the history of English
criminal procedure.

1. John H. Langbein stated: "The constitutional exclusionary rules are for the most
part an American peculiarity. Illegally obtained evidence is generally admitted not only in
Germany and other continental legal systems, but also in England and the Commonwealth
Systems." JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 69
(1977).
2. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE' SERIES REPORT (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437,
535-36, 618 (1989) [hereinafter DOJ REPORT].
3. See id
4. MICHAEL ZANDER, THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984 197 (2d
ed. 1990).
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This Article discusses the remolded structure of the English
criminal justice system and the English courts' vigorous exercise of
exclusionary rules after PACE. Furthermore, this Article will
show that the English criminal justice system's pursuit of
substantial and procedural justice has encountered the same
tension since the 1960s. Additionally, this Article will show that
the English courts have finally accepted the "un-British" concept
of "deterrence." On the other hand, the surprising abolition of the
right to silence demonstrates the necessity of an explicit guarantee
to criminal procedural rights similar to those found in the U.S. Bill
of Rights.
This Article begins with a background of the traditional
It briefly examines two
common law exclusionary rules.
competing perspectives on law reform and two main pre-PACE
proposals to reconstruct the traditional rules. Next, it explores the
new framework of criminal process under PACE and its associated
Codes of Practices. Moreover, it discusses the English courts'
main decisions to vigorously exclude tainted evidence under the
new system. Finally, this Article discusses the debate on the
abolition of the right to silence and reviews the provisions of
CJPOA.
I. TRADITIONAL COMMON LAW EXCLUSIONARY RULES

A. Inclusion of Non-Confessional PhysicalEvidence Subject to
Rarely Exercised JudicialDiscretion
The traditional common law rule of unlawfully obtained nonconfession evidence is known as the "reliability" test."'5 It states
that "relevant and reliable evidence is admissible irrespective of its
provenance." 6 As Justice Crompton's famous statement in Regina
v. Leatham7 summarized, "It matters not how you get it; if you
steal it even, it would be admissible in evidence." 8 Although the
rule recognizes that the judge has discretion to exclude otherwise
admissible evidence, "the discretion has been actually exercised so
rarely that the basis of the power and the circumstances in which it

5.

ADRIANA S. ZUCKERMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE

(1989).
6. Id.
7. See Regina v. Leatham, 8 Cox. C.C. 498 (1861).
& Id. at 501.

343

1999]

English CriminalJustice System

263

9
will be exercised cannot be stated with confidence."
Two leading cases characterize the English courts' position on
the exclusion of unlawfully obtained physical evidence. The first is
Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v. Regina.10 The court upheld the
conviction of a Kenyan for unlawful possession of ammunition
even though the ammunition was discovered by a lower ranking
police officer who was not authorized to conduct such searches.
Lord Goddard C. J. for the Privy Council stated:
The test to be applied in considering whether evidence is
admissible is whether it is relevant to the matter at issue. If it is, it
is admissible and the court is not concerned with how the
evidence was obtained ....No doubt in criminal cases the judge
always has discretion to disallow evidence if the strict rules of
admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused ....If,
for instance, some admission of some piece of evidence, e.g. a
document, had been obtained from a defendant by a trick, no
doubt the judge might properly rule it out. 11
Once the court deemed the illegally obtained evidence
relevant, it was admitted unless the court found under the
"fairness test," that it was unfair to prosecute the accused based on
such evidence. Although obtaining evidence by a trick was
considered unfair, 12 "[b]eing convicted on the basis of illegally
evidence [was] not, in and of itself, . . . 'unfair' to the
obtained 13
accused.'
The second leading case, Regina v. Sang,14 explains the
"fairness test." Although there were some cases where the judge
exercised discretion by expanding the "fairness" test, 15 the House
of Lords in Sang strictly limited the sphere of the judge's
discretion. The issue raised in Sang was whether the judge had

9.

DAVID FELDMAN, THE LAW RELATING TO ENTRY, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 419

(1986).
10. See Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v. Regina, App. Cas. 197 (1955).
11. Id.at 203-04 (emphasis added).
12. See id. at 204.
13. Barry F. Shanks, Comment, Comparative Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule and
Its Alternative, 57 TUL. L. REV. 648,662 (1983).
14. See Regina v. Sang, 2 All E.R. 1222, 1223 (1979).
15. For instance, in Regina v. Payne, 1 All E.R. 848 (1963), the judge exercised his
discretion and admitted reliable evidence of the defendant's blood alcohol content while
in police custody. The police told the accused that upon his agreement, a doctor would
examine him for any illness or disability. The accused consented. At trial, the doctor gave
evidence that the accused had been drunk and a conviction followed.
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discretion to exclude evidence obtained by an agent provocateur
who induced the accused to commit the crime. The Court of
Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision that the judge does not
have discretion to exclude evidence procured from a police
instigated crime.
In affirming the Court of Appeal's decision, the House of
Lords unanimously stated that (i) the trial judge's discretion
operates only to avoid unfairness to the accused at trial; 16 (ii) the
decision to exercise judicial discretion is based upon the probative
value of the evidence balanced against any unfair prejudicial effect
of the evidence upon the accused; 17 (iii) only "evidence obtained
from the accused after the commission of the offense" 18 might be
excluded; and (iv) the judge does not have discretion to exclude
evidence merely because it was obtained by improper or unfair
means. 19 For example, evidence gathered from illegal entrapment
is not within the judge's discretion to exclude. 20 Additionally,
Lord Diplock's often quoted dictum rejected the deterrence
rationale for excluding illegally obtained evidence:
It is no part of a judge's function to exercise disciplinary powers
over the police or prosecution as respects the way in which
evidence to be used at the trial is obtained by them. If it is
obtained illegally there will be a remedy in civil law; if it was
obtained legally but in breach of the rules of conduct for the
police, this is a matter for the appropriate disciplinary authority
to deal with. What the judge at the trial is concerned with is not
how the evidence sought to be adduced by the prosecution has
been21obtained but with how it is used by the prosecution at the
trial.
B. Rigorous Exclusion of Confessions Based on the Voluntariness
Test
Under common law, the "voluntariness" test is the standard
for admitting confessions into evidence. 22 The test was originally

16. See id. at 1222.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 1230.
22. See generally PETER MIRFIELD, CONFESSIONS 42-60 (1985); DAVID WOLCHVER,
THE EXCLUSION OF IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 23-30 (1986) (regarding the
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recognized in 1783 in The King v. Warickshall.23 In Warickshall, a
woman was charged as an accessory to theft and with possession of
stolen property. She confessed her guilt and disclosed the location
of the stolen property. Afterwards, she contended that her
confession and evidence of the property should be excluded
because it was obtained by promises of favors. In rejecting her
contention, Judges Nares J. and Eyre B. formulated the classic
principle underlying the exclusion of confessions:
Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as
inadmissible, under a consideration of whether they are or are
not entitled to credit. A free and voluntary confession is
deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow
from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is admitted as
proof of the crime to which it refers; but a confession forced
from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear,
comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as
the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; and
therefore it is rejected. 24
Consequently, Warickshall established the "voluntariness"
standard and emphasized the requirement of reliable evidence.
After Warickshall, however, the English courts' review of
confessions only focused on whether any threats or promises were
and simply paid "lip-service to
made in exchange for confessions,
25
the unreliability requirement.
The courts took a strict position against confessions obtained
by threat or promise. Even the mildest threat or inducement made
a resulting confession inadmissible. Thus, the voluntariness test
retains a very strong bite. For example, in Regina v. Cass,26 the
court, in an added footnote, stated that "the slightest hopes of
mercy held out to a prisoner to induce him to disclose the fact, was
sufficient to invalidate a confession." 27 Furthermore, in Regina v.
Moore,28 the court stated that "a rule has been laid down in the
different precedents by which we are bound, and that is, if the
threat or inducement is held out, actually or constructively by a

history of common law confession rules).
23. See The King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach C.C. 263 (1783).
24. See WOLCHVER, supra note 22, at 24-25.
25. MIRFIELD, supra note 22, at 49.
26. See Regina v. Cass, 1 Leach C.C. 293n (1784).
27. MIRFIELD, supra note 22, at 49.
28. See Regina v. Moore, 2 Den. 522 (1852).
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person in authority, it [the confession] cannot be received, however
'29
slight the threat or inducement.
In 1914, this trend was confirmed in a famous leading case,
Ibrahim v. The King.30 Ibrahim, a private in the Indian Army, was
arrested and charged with the murder of a superior officer
immediately after the officer was found shot dead. After his
commanding officer asked why he had done such a senseless act,
Ibrahim confessed. Although there was no evidence that Ibrahim
was pressured by fear or hope to confess, Lord Sumner stated that:
It has long been established as a positive principle of English
criminal law, that no statement by an accused is admissible in
evidence against him unless it is shown by the prosecution to
have been a voluntary statement, in the sense that it has not
been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope
of
31
advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority.
Mark Berger observed that "by the early part of the twentieth
century the voluntariness standard had become firmly grounded in
English common law, but with a focus that de-emphasized the
issue of reliability in favor of an apparent objective of regulating
police tactics." 32 The reliability principle "remained extant, buried
deep, neither exclusively nor conclusively having its way, but alive
nevertheless."

33

Callis v. Gunn34 added another requirement to Lord
Sumner's formulation in Ibrahim. Lord Goddard C. J., in his ex
tempre judgment, suggested the exclusion of confessions obtained
in an oppressive manner by force or against the wishes of the

29. See WOLCHVER, supra note 22, at 26.
30. See Ibrahim v. The King, App. Cas. 599 (1914). More recent cases advocating the
voluntariness test also exist. In Northam, the defendant, before confessing, asked whether
a different offense might be taken into consideration at his trial rather than being the
subject of a separate trial. Because of the police officer's acceptance of the defendant's
suggestion, the conviction was quashed. See Northam v. King, 52 Crim. App. 97 (1967).
In Zaveckas, the defendant asked whether he could have bail if he made a statement and
confessed. The conviction was quashed because of the judge's admission of the
confession. See Regina v. Zaveckas, 53 Crim. App. 202 (1969); see also ZANDER, supra
note 4, at 186.
31. Mark Berger, Legislating Confession Law in GreatBritain: A Statutory Approach
to Police Interrogation,24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 11 (1990). Lord Summer's definition
of voluntariness became part of the Judges' Rules discussed infra Part I.C.
32. Id. at 11.
33. WOLCHVER, supra note 22, at 30.
34. See Callis v. Gunn, 1 Q.B. 494 (1964).
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accused person.35 The Court of Appeal in Regina v. Prager36 and
Regina v. Hudson37 subsequently recognized this requirement.
Accordingly, the two requirements of Ibrahim and Gunn became
known as the "voluntariness" standard which the police are
required to follow.38
C. Nominal Right to Legal Advice and Right to Silence under the
Judges' Rules
The Judges' Rules originated in 1906 from Lord Chief Justice
39
Alverstone's reply letter to the Chief Constable of Birmingham.
The Rules gave an accused the right to silence, the right to legal
advice and the right to be advised of these rights.40 The Rules
proclaimed that "police officers, otherwise than by arrest, cannot
compel any person against his will to come to or remain in any
police station .... "41 Furthermore,
[E]very person at any stage of an investigation should be able to
communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor. This is so
even if he is in custody, provided that in such a case no
reasonable delay or hindrance is caused to the process42of
investigation or the administration of justice by his doing so.
Thus, "when a police officer who is making inquiries of any person
about an offense has enough to prefer a charge against that person

35. See id. at 501.
36. See Regina v. Prager, 1 All E.R. 1114 (1972).
37. See Regina v. Hudson, 72 Crim. App. 163 (1981).
38. The standard:
[Ilt is a fundamental condition of the admissibility in evidence against any
person, equally of any oral answer given by that person to a question put by a
police officer and of any statement made by that person, that is shall have been
voluntary, in the sense that it has not been obtained from him by fear of
prejudice or hope of advantage, exercised or held out by a person in authority,
or by oppression.
Judges' Rules and Administrative Directions to the Police, Home Office Circular No.
89/1978 [hereinafter Judges' Rules], reprinted in ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OFFENSES IN ENGLAND AND

WALES: THE LAW AND PROCEDURE, 1981, Cmnd. N. 8092-1, app. 12, at 154 [hereinafter
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OFFENSES IN ENGLAND AND WALES].

39. See id. See also Origin and History of the Judges' Rules, in INVESTIGATION AND
13, at 162-65.
40. H. Richard Uviller imagined that Chief Justice Warren had run across the British
Judges' Rules when he wrote Miranda. H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 123
(1996).
41. Judges' Rules, supra note 38, app. 12, at 153-54.
42. d.
PROSECUTION OFFENSES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, app.
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be
for the offense, he should without delay caution that person to 43
charged or informed that he may be prosecuted for the offense."
Additionally, Rule I directed a police officer to state the
following caution before questioning a suspect, "You are not
obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say
may be put into writing and given in evidence." 44 Rule III(a)
required that the suspect, when charged, be warned in the same
45
form as Rule 1.
These Judges' Rules, however, were not rules of law but
merely administrative directives to help police officers administer
justice in the fairest manner possible. The evidence, however, was
not inadmissible per se for lack of conformity with the Rules.
Instead, the judge had discretion to include or exclude a statement
obtained in breach of the Rules.46 John Baldwin and Michael
McConville observed:
It is clear, then, that even in principle the "right" of access to a
solicitor during a police interrogation is far from absolute; it is
qualified by the provisions as to "unreasonable delay or
hindrance," and the courts have shown themselves reluctant to
merely because it has been obtained in breach
exclude evidence
47
of the Rules.
To summarize Part 1, the traditional rule in England
regarding unlawfully obtained physical evidence was "inclusion,"
with a few exceptions, except the rigorous exclusion of involuntary
confession, the traditional English exclusionary rules were quite
limited. J.B. Dawson observed in 1982:
The English judiciary are to exercise no control over the police
and the ability of the alternative remedies to deter in fact is not
even discussed ....For the fact that the English judge does not

43. Id.
44. Id. app. 12, at 154.
45. The warning was, "Do you wish to say anything? You are not obliged to say
anything unless you wish to do so but whatever you say will be taken down into writing
and may be given in evidence." Id.
46. See INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OFFENSES IN ENGLAND AND WALES,
supra note 38, at 26-27. See also Regina v. Voisin, 13 Crim. App. 89 (1918); Regina v.
Wattam, 36 Crim. App. 72 (1952); Regina v. Prager, 1 W.L.R. 260 (1972).
47. John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Police Interrogationand the Right to See a
Solicitor, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 145, 147. Disciplinary action against officers for breaching
the Rules was virtually unknown. See Laurence Koffman, Safeguarding the Rights of the
Citizen, in POLICE: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMUNITY 27 (John Baxter &
Laurence Koffman eds., 1985).
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even retain the option of excluding evidence obtained by illegal
search and seizure means such conduct will seldom be
scrutinized for the illegality of the police conduct, will not be a
live issue in criminal trials, there will be no voir dire at which
police officers may be cross-examined with regard to the
propriety of their actions48and no incentive for defense counsel
to even raise such issues.
II. Two RIVAL PERSPECTIVES FOR LAW REFORM:
UTILITARIAN V. LIBERTARIAN

The law and order lobby and the civil libertarian lobby49 are
two different perspectives regarding the reconstruction of
traditional law in England.
The debate between the two
philosophies mirrors the U.S. exclusionary rules debate.
The law and order lobby makes an argument based on the
Benthamite-utilitarianism theory. 50 England has a long tradition
of law reform "stretching back to Bentham." 51
This is
"fundamentally subversive to the underlying assumptions of the
native tradition of English common law as it exists." 52 The law
and order lobby believes the adversary system turns "trial into a
'cricket game' in which the ultimate purpose of getting at the truth

48. J. B. Dawson, The Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence: A Comparative
Study, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 513,536-37 (1982).
49. See Koffman, supra note 47, at 14.
50. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 454 (John Bowring ed., 1843) (emphasis in original). Bentham
ridiculed the idea of procedural fairness in criminal procedure in his famous "fox-hunter's
reason":
This consists in introducing upon the carpet of legal procedure the idea of
fairness, in the sense in which the word is used by sportsman. The fox is to have
a fair chance for his life; he must have (so close is the analogy) what is called
law-leave to run a certain length of way for the express purpose of giving him a
chance for escape. While under pursuit, he must not be shot; it would be as
unfair as convicting him of burglary on a hen-roost in five minutes time, in a
court conscience. In the sporting code, these laws are rational. Amusement is
that end; a certain quantity of delay is essential to it; dispatch, a degree of
dispatch reducing the quantity of delay below the allowed minimum, would be
fatal to it.
Id. Bentham's fundamental rule of evidence is plain: "Let in the light of evidence. The
end it leads to is the direct end of justice .... Evidence is the basis of justice; and to
exclude evidence is to exclude justice." hIdat 336, 338 (emphasis added).
51. Id.
52. Robert S.Gerstein, The Self-Incrimination Debate in Great Britain, 27 AM. J.
COMP. L. 81, 82 (1979).

270
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[is] entirely lost.",53 The right to silence, in particular, is considered
"one of the very things which turn law into cricket. ' 54 Michael
King summarized the law and order argument as "a system
whereby the rules obstruct the police and protect the guilty. '55
The argument continues with the belief that adversary
concepts are not to be given a legitimate role in the pre-trial
stage. 56
Exclusionary rules are obstacles to truth-finding,
therefore, they should be abolished or at least kept to a minimum.
Although the law and order lobby is concerned with abuse of
power, their approach focuses on the "practical measures" to
prevent it, while. "still allowing the, police as much freedom as
possible to carry on their efforts at crime control efficiently. '57
The growth of the crime rate and the emergence of more
professional criminals lend persuasive evidence to this argument.
The law and order lobby criticizes criminal procedure as
mainly concerned with "hardened criminals" and "a large and
increasing class of sophisticated professional criminals," who are
"well aware of their legal rights and use every possible means to
avoid a conviction if caught. ' 58 Although the crime rate in the
English criminal justice system is not as severe as that in the
United States, it is steadily increasing. Since 1980 however, the
U.S. crime rate has declined, while the British crime rate has
59
continued to rise.
Contrary to the law and order lobby, the civil libertarians take
a completely different position. In discussing "the inherent
conflict between prosecution and accused," they argue that "[tihe
criminal law ... is not designed to facilitate crime control but to
prevent abuse of power and to protect the liberty of the
individual. 60
53. Id. at 98. Police spokesmen, notably the then Chief Constable of Leicester
Robert Mark, succinctly summarized the perspective of the "law and order" lobby stating:
"[T]rial has come to be regarded as a game of skill and chance in which the rules are
binding on one side only." ROBERT REINER, The Politicsof the Act, in PUBLIC LAW 394,
396 (1985).
54. Id.
55. MICHAEL KING, THE FRAMEWORK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 127 (1981).
56. See Gerstein, supra note 52, at 98.
57. Id. at 102.
58.

CRIMINAL LAW

REVISION

COMMITTEE,

ELEVENTH

REPORT,

EVIDENCE

(GENERAL) 1972, Cmnd. 4991, at para. 21 [hereinafter CLRC REPORT].
59. See Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A
Comparisonof the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8-9 (1986).

60. Gerstein, supra note 52, at 102.
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The utilitarian concept that truth-finding is fundamental to
the criminal process is criticized as "a disturbing misunderstanding
of what the legal system in this country is all about. '61 Michael
McConville argues that:
[T]he trial is not a search for the "truth." It is an arena in which
different versions of reality compete. Legal truth is not a
discoverable entity existing outside the trial process; it is, and
only is, a product of the trial process itself ....

The failure in

question is not failure of justice; the failure was a failure of the
prosecution62 to adequately prove guilt unaided by the
defendant.
The civil libertarians contend that the purpose of a trial is to
determine whether the prosecution can prove a specific allegation
against a person. Therefore, the adversary concepts must operate
63
throughout the criminal justice system.
Civil libertarians focus on the increasing number of
"miscarriages of justice," 64 "rough justice," 65 and police
corruption. There are many notorious cases in which the police
elicited false confessions and, more alarmingly, deliberately forged
evidence. 66
Similarly, instances exist where police officers
systematically took bribes when working in specialist squads that
dealt with lucrative crimes such as gaming, obscene publications

61. Remarks of Clinton Davis, Commons Debates,quoted in Gerstein, supra note 52,
at 99.
62. Michael McConville, Silence in Court,NEW LJ. 1169, 1170 (1987).
63. See Gerstein, supra note 52, at 99.
64. Clive Walker, Introduction, in JUSTICE IN ERROR 2 (Clive Walker & Keir
Starmer eds., 1993). Walker states that a miscarriage occurs
[Wihenever individuals are treated by the State in breach of their rights;
whenever individuals are reacted adversely by the State to a disproportionate
extent in comparison with the need to protect the rights of others; or whenever
the rights of others are not properly protected or vindicated by State action
against wrongdoers.
Id. at4.
65. See generally PETER HILL & MARTIN YOUNG, ROUGH JUSTICE (1985); PETER
HILL ET AL., MORE ROUGH JUSTICE (1985).
66. The Guilford Four case, the Maguire Seven case, the Birmingham Six case, and
the Armagh Fourcase (discussing other wrongful convictions of Irish terrorist cases). The
Guilford Fourwere the subject of a popular 1994 film, "In the Name of the Father." There
are also many recognized miscarriages which do not relate to terrorism, for instance, the
Tottemham Three case, the Kiszko case, the Darvell brothers case, and the Cardiff Three
case. See Joshua Rozenberg, Miscarriageof Justice, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER STRESS
(Eric Stockdale & Silvia Casale eds., 1992); see also Walker, supra note 64, at 6-13.
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and drugs. 67 After the 1960s, a "Golden Age" of public
acceptance for the role of the police broke down and the police
68
image transformed "from plod to pig."
Next, the civil libertarians strongly appeal to the "take rights
seriously" 69 attitude, stating:
[W]e liberal reformists tended to accept at face value the
rhetoric of rationality and due process which pervades the
formal rules of evidence and procedure. If the system is
supposed to be fair and just, then the existing rules must be
enforced and new rules introduced to combat police abuses,
help and protect
defendants and restrain the excess of some
70
magistrates.
Pointing out the hollowness of the civil litigation, and criminal
prosecution against an officer who breaks the rules, civil
libertarians argue that exclusion is "really only one possible
sanction which would ensure compliance with the rules." Another
deterrent is that if you break the rules you fail to achieve your
71
Civil
objective because you are likely to lose your case.
libertarians recognize that the abuse of individual liberty by
authority is "not something which depends upon the actual extent
of abuse at any particular time." 72 Rather, its importance is "a

67. See David Feldman, Introduction: The Developing Debate on Policing Law and
Management, 20 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991). See also ROBERT REINER, THE
POLITICS OF THE POLICE 78-81 (2d ed., 1992).

68. John Beynon, Policing in the Limelight" Citizens, Constablesand Controversy, in
THE POLICE: POWER, PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES 7 (John Benyon & Colin Bourn
eds., 1986); see also REINER, supra note 67, at 72-77.
69. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). Dworkin
argues that "[t]he institution of rights . . . represents the majority's promise to the
minorities that their dignity and equality will be respected." Id at 205. Thus individual
rights are "political trumps" to "do something even when the majority thinks it would be
wrong to do it, and even when the majority would be worse off for having it done." Id at
194 (emphasis added).
70. KING, supra note 55, at 126-27. Thus, they criticize the gap between legal theory
and police practice:
A wide range of prosecution evidence can be legally produced and presented,
despite the rhetoric of a system geared overwhelmingly to safeguards for the
accused, precisely because legal structure, legal procedure, legal rulings, not
legal rhetoric, govern the legitimate practice of criminal justice, and there is
quite simply a distinct gap between the substance and the ideology of the law.
D.J. MACBARNET, CONVICTION 155 (1981).
71. See Paul Sieghart, Reliable Evidence, Fairly Obtained, in THE POLICE: POWER,
PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES, 272 (1992).
72. Gerstein, supra note 52, at 103.
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matter of principle." 73
Each perspective has a coherent system in its different way,
yet, a fundamental disagreement has been maintained for a long
time. The confrontation between the perspectives has been
reproduced in every debate for reconstruction of the English
criminal justice system.
III. MAJOR ATITEMPTS TO REORIENT THE TRADITIONAL RULES

This section reviews two important governmental reports that
played crucial roles in reorienting the traditional rules and
providing a theoretical basis for the current English criminal
justice system.
A. The Eleventh Report of the CriminalLaw Revision Committee
of 1972
The Eleventh Report of the Criminal Law Revision
Committee (CLRC) was the first committee to reconstruct the
traditional exclusionary rules based on the law and order
perspective. The CLRC, created in 1959 by the Conservative
Home Secretary, submitted several important recommendations to
revise exclusionary rules in 1972.
The CLRC began with a familiar Benthamite-utilitarian
philosophy:
Since the object of a criminal trial should be to find out if the
accused is guilty, it follows that ideally all evidence should be
admissible which is relevant in the sense that it tends to render
probable the existence or non-existence of any fact on which
the question of guilt or innocence depends ....

We have

throughout aimed at reducing the exceptions to admissibility
under the present law ....

We need hardly say that we have no

wish to lessen the fairness of criminal trials. But it must be clear
what fairness means in this connection. It means, or ought to
mean, that the law should be such as will secure as far as
74
possible that the result of the trial is the right one.
The CLRC argued that traditional "strict and formal"
evidence rules for the protection of the accused were the product
of a time when "scales used to be loaded against the defense in

73. Id.
74. CLRC REPORT, supra note 58, at paras. 14,20,27.
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ways which it is difficult now to remember." 75 The rules no longer
served justice, but had become a hindrance because the general
quality of the criminal justice system had improved. 76 The
committee observed that in the English criminal justice system
"fairness seem[ed] often to be thought of as something which is
77
due to the defence only."
The CLRC proposed many fundamental changes to the
traditional evidence law. First, they critically reviewed the
traditional rule of strict exclusion for "involuntary" statements. 78
Based on the "reliability principle," 79 the CLRC recommended
that only threats or inducements likely to render a confession
unreliable or a confession acquired through oppression be
excluded. 80 The CLRC also recommended that the "fruit" of
81
inadmissible confessions be admissible.
Second, the CLRC proposed the most controversial
recommendation in English criminal law history-abolition of the
right to silence:
To forbid it [drawing adverse inferences for the silence of the
accused] seems to us to be contrary sense and, without helping
the innocent, to give an unnecessary advantage to the guilty.
Hardened criminals often take advantage of the present rule to
refuse to answer any questions at all, and this may greatly
hamper the police and even bring their investigations to halt.

75. Id. at para. 21.4.
76. See id at para. 21(i)-(v).
77. IId. at para. 27.
78. See id at paras. 53-63. After the CLRC's report, the case law on confessions
moved in the direction of the CLRC's recommendation. In Directorof Public Prosecutor
v. Ping Lin, 3 All E.R. 175 (1975), the suspect, a drug dealer, sought to gain favorable
treatment by offering to identify his supplier. The police refused to make a deal, but
informed the suspect that he was sure the judge would remember the suspect's help at the
time of sentencing. Stating that the prosecution was required to show "as a matter of fact"
that the threat or promise had not induced the confession, the House of Lords ruled the
voluntariness test had not been violated. Id at 180. In Regina v. Rennie, 1 All E.R. 385
(1982), the Lord Chief Justice stated: "Even if ... the appellant had decided to admit his
guilt because he hoped that if he did so the police would cease their investigation of the
part played by his mother, it does not follow that the confession should have been
excluded." Id. at 388.
79. See CLRC REPORT, supra note 58, at paras. 62-64. The CLRC limitedly accepted
the deterrent justification when they rejected the suggestion that all confessions should go
to the jury. See id.
80. See id. at para. 61.
81. See id. at para. 68.
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Therefore, the abolition of the restriction would help justice. 82
The CLRC recommended that the judge and jury be allowed
to draw an adverse inference of guilt against an accused person
who failed to state a fact during police questioning that was later
relied upon in his defense 83 or if the accused person failed to give
84
evidence.
Third, the CLRC recommended that the caution be modified
and administered only after the suspect was charged or officially
informed that he would be prosecuted. 85
Although this
recommendation was first rejected by the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act of 1984, it was eventually accepted in the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act of 1994.
The CLRC's proposals were "a part of Britain's move to join
Europe," 86 although the Report denied any intention to replace
the English adversary system with the Continental inquisitorial
system. 87 Although the Report received support from the police
and prosecutor groups, it attracted a storm of criticism from the
civil libertarians and was denounced by almost all commentators. 88
The report's proposal to abolish the right to silence provoked
particularly strong resistance. 89
B. The Report of the Royal Commission on CriminalProcedureof
1981
Just before the Labour government left office in 1979, it set
up the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (Royal
Commission). 90 The outcry following the Confait case, 91 which
82. Id. at para. 30.
83. See id. at para. 32.
84. See id. at paras. 108-13.
85. See id. at para. 44.
86. Gerstein, supra note 52, at 82-83. JUSTICE (the British Section of the
International Commission of Jurists) made a more radical proposal to reject the current
common law process and to adopt the Continental alternative. See id. at 92-95.
87. See CLRC REPORT, supra note 58, at para. 13.
88. See Gerstein, supra note 52, at 84-87; Mark Berger, Rethinking Self-Incrimination
in Great Britain,61 DENV. U. L. REV. 507,516-17 (1984).
89. See Michael Zander, The CLRC Report - A Survey of Reactions, 1974 LAW Soc.
GAZETTE 954.
90. See THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1981, Cmnd. 8092, at
para. 1.11 [hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT].
91. See Regina v. Lattimore, 62 Crim. App. 53 (1975). On April 22, 1972, Maxwell
Confait was found dead in his blazing home. Three teenage boys, Ronald Leighton, Colin
Lattimore and Ahmet Salih confessed and were convicted of murder, manslaughter and
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sentenced three teenagers convicted of murder, manslaughter and
arson to three years detention, prompted formation of the
92
commission that led to substantial changes in the police powers.
Although the Royal Commission, like the CLRC, sought to reduce
the sphere of the traditional exclusionary rule, the Royal
Commission took a more moderate position. Facing a challenge to
strike "a fundamental balance" between state and individual
interests, 93 the Royal Commission presented its Report of 1981 as
"part of a package which aimed to strengthen both police powers
and suspects' rights without shifting the balance one way or the
94
other."
First, the Royal Commission, referring to the United States'
experience that automatic exclusionary rules significantly deter
improper police conduct, rejected the automatic rules as a means
of securing compliance. 95 The Royal Commission recommended
police supervision and internal discipline or civil actions for
damages as a better way to inhibit police misconduct. 96 It chose to
combine the "reliability principle" and the "protective principle"
as rationales for the exclusionary rule regarding the "protective
principle." The Royal Commission stated:
Where certain standards are set for the conduct of criminal
investigations, citizens can expect, indeed they have a right, to
be treated in accordance with those standards. If they are not
so treated, then they should not be put at risk nor should the
investigator gain an advantage.
The courts have the
responsibility for protecting the citizen's rights. The most
appropriate way to do so in these circumstances is to remove
arson. Lattimore was mentally retarded with a mental age of approximately eight. After a
lengthy campaign to re-open the case, the Court of Appeal in October 1975, quashed the
verdicts. The three boys spent three years in detention. The official inquiry into the case
by Sir Henry Fisher, reported in 1977, revealed that the Judges' Rules were routinely
ignored. Fisher's suggestion that reform of the Rules should be conducted triggered the
establishment of the Royal Commission. See J. Baxter & L. Koffman, The Confait
Inheritance - Forgotten Lesson, 14 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 11, 11-12 (1983) [hereinafter
Baxter].
92. See Baxter, supra note 91, at 11-12.
93. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at para. 1.11.
94. See Andrew Sanders, Rights, Remedies, and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act,
CRIM. L. REV. 802 (1988). See also ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at
paras. 1.32-1.35.
95. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at paras. 4.123-4.128. They
also paid attention to the difference between the British and American criminal justice
systems. Id. at paras. 4.126-4.127.
96. See id. at paras. 4.118-4.122.
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from the investigator his source of advantage and from the
accused the cause of risk, that is to exclude the evidence ....In
contrast to the disciplinary principle this approach can leave it
to the court to exercise a discretion not to exclude evidence
when the breach of the rules is trivial or does not infringe the
suspect's right ....97

The Royal Commission proposed that Parliament make rules
based on the reliability and protective principles to control police
conduct,98 stating that, "[I]t is not satisfactory to leave the content
and enforcement of these rules to the courts . .

.

. Parliament

99
should take responsibility for deciding what the rules should be."
Second, the Royal Commission concluded that the
"voluntariness" test was too imprecise and vague to offer guidance
to police and judges. 100 It proposed changing the rules to
automatically exclude a confession if the suspect was subject to
"violence, threats of violence, torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment." 101 Any other statements obtained through a lesser
breach of the rules, even if involuntary under the traditional law,
would be included or excluded based on the "reliability

principle."102

Third, the Royal Commission rejected the CLRC's proposal
to abolish the right to silence. It was concerned that the proposal
"put strong (and additional) psychological pressure upon some
suspects to answer questions without knowing precisely what was
10 3
the substance of and evidence for the accusations against them."'

97. Id. at para. 4.130. See also A.J. Ashworth, Excluding Evidence as Protective
Rights, CRIM. L. REV. 723,725 (1977).
9& See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at para. 4.131.
99. Id.
100. See id. at paras. 4.70-4.73. The Royal Commission stated:
What this amounts to is that a police officer is required under the confusion and
pressures of an investigation to make some assessment of the character,
susceptibilities and mental state of the suspect whom he is interviewing and then
to try to adapt his questioning to that assessment. He may then find that the
judge, having heard witnesses often months after the event and in the entirely
different environment of a court, makes his own assessment of the character,
susceptibilities and mental state of the suspect at the time of the interrogation
and of the conditions of that interrogation, and decides, that, he, the police
officer, behaved 'oppressively,' that is that he broke the rule. This cannot be
satisfactory.
Id. at 4.72.
101. Id. at para. 4.132.
102. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at para. 4.133.
103. Id. at para. 4.50.
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Furthermore, the proposal "might well increase the risk of
innocent people, particularly those who are under suspicion for the
first time, making damaging statements." 10 4
The Royal
Commission was also concerned that the CLRC's proposal was
inconsistent with the principle requiring the prosecution to have
10 5
the burden of proof.
Fourth, while the Royal Commission supported an
enhancement in police powers of stop, entry, and search-andseizure, 10 6 they also recommended the "obligatory exclusion" of
the evidence obtained in violation of their proposed search-andseizure rules. 10 7 Although the Royal Commission disfavored a
compulsory exclusionary rule, they were also unsatisfied with
relying on judicial discretion. The Royal Commission believed
10 8
that increased police power needed to be balanced.
Although criticized by most radical and liberal opinions as "a
triumph for the police over their civil libertarian critics,"'1 9 the
Report was widely approved by the mainstream professional legal
organizations with only minimal reservations. 110 By and large,
PACE and the Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and
Questioning of Persons by Police Officers (Interrogation Code) 111
are a direct result of the Royal Commission. Several parts of the
Report were rejected or modified, however, and the CLRC's
proposals were also widely omitted in PACE. Thus, PACE was
born without blessing from either side of the two contending
lobbies.
IV. NEW FRAMEWORK OF CRIMINAL PROCESS UNDER THE POLICE
AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984

PACE is the first nation-wide legislation to regulate the entire
criminal process and provide a "framework for police

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
See id. at para. 4.52.
See id. at paras. 3.20-3.41.
See id. at para. 3.49 (emphasis added).
108. See FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 427.
109. Introduction,in POLICE: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMUNITY, supra note
47, at 1.
110. See REINER, supra note 53, at 398.
111. See CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE DETENTION, TREATMENT AND QUESTIONING
OF

PERSONS

BY

POLICE OFFICERS

[hereinafter

INTERROGATION

CODE].

Interrogation Code was authorized by PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 66, and revised in 1990.

The
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professionalism." 112 Although it is not part of the legislation
itself,113 the Interrogation Code is considered "the bible for the
officer in the police station." 114 This section reviews the new
framework of the entry, search-and-seizure, detention and
interrogation power under PACE and the Code.
A. Extended Police Powers to Stop, Entry, and Search-and-Seizure
PACE embraces the Royal Commission's recommendation
that stop and search powers should be uniform throughout the
country and should extend to offensive weapons. 115 It gives police
search-and-seizure, thereby
extended power of stop, entry, and
116
legitimizing existing police practice.
Section I of PACE provides that upon "reasonable ground of
suspicion," 117 police may search "any person or vehicle" and
"anything which is in or on a vehicle" for "stolen or prohibited
articles," 1 18 including weapons and illegal drugs. Police may
detain a person or a vehicle for such searches. 119 These powers
apply in public places and publicly accessible areas, but not in

112. Barrie Irving, The InterrogationProcess, in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES
AND PROPRIETIES 7, at 148 (John Benyon & Colin Bourn eds., 1986).
113. A breach of the Code does not necessarily make the evidence inadmissible and
cannot be made the basis of either criminal or civil proceedings. Prior to April 1995, a
breach of the Code was automatically a breach of police disciplinary rules and could in
theory result in disciplinary proceedings being brought. PACE, art. 67(8) (Eng.). But in
fact such proceedings were brought extremely rarely and now, under the Police and
Magistrates' Courts Act 1994, section 37(a), such a breach is no longer automatically a
disciplinary offense. Michael Zander, You Have No Right to Remain Silent Abolition of
the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination in England, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659,661 (1996).
114. Michael Zander, The Act in the Station, in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES
AND PROPRIETIES 7, at 123 (John Benyon & Colin Bourn eds., 1986).
115. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at para. 3.20.
116. See id. at paras. 3.14-3.15.
117. PACE, art. 1(3) (Eng.).
118. Id. art. 1(2)(a) (Eng.). Bradley pointed out the difference between the English
search and the U.S. search:
The English 'search' is .. . broader than the U.S. 'frisk,' which requires a
suspicion that the subject be armed and dangerous, but narrower than the U.S.
'search,' which requires probable cause but may be for any evidence. Moreover,
the English search of the person does not flow automatically from an arrest, as in
the United States. Rather, it is limited, both as to its inception and its scope, by
'reasonable grounds for suspicion.' However, once the suspect is actually taken
to the police station, the custody officer must undertake a full inventory search,
as is the practice in the United States.
Craig M. Bradley, The Emerging InternationalConsensus as to Criminal ProcedureRules,
14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 171, 178 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
119. See PACE, art. 1(2)(b).
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dwellings. 120
Section 8 of PACE provides that, on application from a
constable, a justice of peace may issue warrants to enter and
121
search premises for evidence of "serious arrestable offenses."'
Warrants for entry and search, however, are not always necessary.
Section 17 provides that a constable may enter and search any
premises without a search warrant for the purpose of (i) executing
an arrest warrant; (ii) arresting a person for an arrestable offense;
(iii) recapturing a person who is unlawfully at large and whom he
is pursuing; and (iv) saving life or limb or preventing serious
damage to property, and so forth. 122 Under Section 18, a
constable may also enter and search "any premises occupied or
controlled" by the arrestee if reasonable grounds exist for
suspecting that evidence of the instant, or connected, offenses are
inside. 123 Under Codes of Practice, consent searches are available
if an occupant gives written consent after a constable informs the
occupant that consent is not required and that anything seized may
124
be used as evidence.

120. See id. art. 1(1). "Search in public" is similar to the U.S. "frisk." Id
121. Id art. 116. "Serious arrestable offenses" cover the most serious felonies, such as
murder, rape, kidnapping, drug crimes, and other offenses leading to "serious injury to any
person" or "serious financial loss." Id. The warrant requirement is that a magistrate is
satisfied when:
there are reasonable grounds for believing (a) that a serious arrestable offence
has been committed; (b) that there is material on premises specified in the
application which is likely to be of substantial value (whether by itself or
together with other material) to the investigation of the offense; (c) that the
material is likely to be relevant evidence; (d) that it does not consist of or
include items subject to legal privilege ... and (e) that any of the conditions
specified in subsection (3) below applies.
Id. art. 8(1). The conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(e) above are:
(a) that it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant
entry to the premises... (c) that entry to the premises will not be granted unless
a warrant is produced; (d) that the purpose of a search may be frustrated or
seriously prejudiced unless a constable arriving at the premises can secure
immediate entry to them.
Id. art. 8(3).
122 See id. art. 17(1)(a)-(e).
123. Id. art. 18(1). Contrary to the U.S. law, PACE allows a search of premises
incident to arrest, even when the suspect is not arrested on the premises. See Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Bradley, supra note 118, at 181.
124. See CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE SEARCHING OF PREMISES BY POLICE
OFFICERS AND SEIZURE OF PROPERTY FOUND BY POLICE OFFICERS ON PERSONS OR

PREMISES, art. 4.
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Section 25 provides police the power to arrest, without 125a
warrant, if there are "reasonable grounds for suspicion."'
Constables may search arrested persons if they have "reasonable
grounds for believing that the arrested person may present a
danger to himself or others." 126 Constables also possess power to
"search the arrested person for anything (i) which he might use to
assist him to escape from lawful custody; or (ii) which might be
evidence relating to an offence."' 127 Finally, constables may "enter
and search any premises in which the accused was when arrested
he was arrested for evidence relating-to the
or immediately before
128
offence."'
arresting
The criterion of "reasonable suspicion" is "aimed at inhibiting
the police from stopping and searching indiscriminately or, in
discriminatory ways without unduly fettering their ability to detect
crime."' 129 The Royal Commission itself, however, admitted that
"reasonable suspicion" could be construed to give unbridled
130
latitude with respect to searches.
The record-keeping requirement serves as the primary
safeguard against such abuses. Officers that conduct a stop and
search must make a detailed written record of the event, unless it
is not practicable, 131 and inform the person searched that he or she
132
is entitled to ask-for a copy of the record within twelve months.
This safeguard, however, is simply "internal" and "selfaccountable" and independent of judicial control. Commentators
suggest "external" review if critics attack this safeguard as
ineffective. 133

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

PACE, art. 25(1).
Id. art. 32(1).
Id. art. 32 (2)(a).
Id. art. 32 (2)(b).
ANDREW SANDERS & RICHARD YOUNG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 38 (1994).

See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at para. 3.25.
See id. art. 3(1) (Eng.); See also HOME OFFICE, CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE
EXERCISE BY POLICE OFFICERS OF STATUTORY POWERS OF STOP AND SEARCH, at para.
130.

131.

4.1.
132. See id. art. 3(7)-(9) (Eng.).
133. Vaugahn Bevan & Ken Lindstone, The New Law of Search and Seizure: Castle
Built with Air?, 1985 PUBLIC LAW 423, 437; see also Gabrielle Cox, Openness and
Accountability, in THE POLICE: POWER, PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES 7, at 167-68

(John Benyon & Colin Bourn eds., 1986). The Policy Studies Institute's study showed that
records of stops and searches were made in only about a half of all cases. See also DAVID
J. SMITH & JEREMY GRAY, POLICE AND PEOPLE IN LONDON, VOL. IV, THE POLICE IN

ACTION 236 (1982).
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B. Durationand Conditions of Detention
134
Following the Royal Commission's recommendation,
PACE established a new framework for detention. 135 Police can
detain a suspect for twenty-four hours without formally charging
him. 136 Officers of the rank of superintendent or above may
extend detention to thirty-six hours.137 Magistrates may extend
detention to a maximum of ninety-six hours.138 In addition,
authorities may hold suspects incommunicado for up to thirty-six
hours for serious offenses. 139 This surprisingly long extension of
the detention period draws criticism as "an affront in a democratic
140
society."'
Several new detention requirements serve to curb the power
afforded by three extensions. 141 First, PACE created the position
of "custody officer." 142 Custody officers ensure that police
143
observe PACE requirements and the Interrogation Code.
Second, the initial detention review must take place after six hours
by a "review officer," which includes the "custody officer," and
thereafter at nine hour intervals. 144 Third, authorities must afford
detained persons a continuous period of at least eight hours to rest
every two
free from questioning, 145 a break from interviewing
146
hours, and a break for meals at reasonable times.
Law enforcement authorities criticize this new system as
providing professional criminals with an opportunity "not only to
discover the strength of the police's case at an early stage, but also

134. The frame was made following the Royal Commission's recommendation. See
ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at para. 3.10(5).
135. In the United States, if a suspect is arrested without a warrant, he is entitled to a
"prompt" post-arrest probable cause hearing. See Gernstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
The "promptness" ordinarily means forty-eight hours. See County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. See PACE, art. 41(1).
137. See id. art. 42(1).
138. See id.
art. 44 (3)(b).
139. Id. art. 56 (2)(a),(3).
140. David Ashby, Safeguardingthe Suspec4 in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES,
AND PROPRIETIES 7, at 188.
141. In addition, bail may be set just after or simultaneously with arrest. See
MAGISTRATES' COURTS ACT 1980, art. 117.
142. PACE, art. 36(1).
143. See fid
144. See id.art. 40.
145. See INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 111, at para. 12.2.
146. See id. at para. 12.7.
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283

during any subsequent proceedings to make fallacious attacks
upon the officer responsible for the investigation in an effort to
147
escape conviction."
C. Right to Counsel and Caution
1. Access to Legal Advice
PACE and the Interrogation Code, which are both based on
the Royal Commission's approach, 148 provide the statutory basis
"aims to counterfor the accused's right to counsel. The provision
149
detention."'
of
balance increased powers
Section 58 of PACE provides that a suspect enjoys an
absolute right to counsel "privately at any time."'150 "Duty
solicitor schemes" were provided for financially challenged
suspects. 151 If a suspect makes such a request, police must allow
consultation "as soon as practical except to the extent that delay is
permitted."'1 52 Authorities must record the request on the custody
record. 153 Conversely, the Interrogation Code allows the suspect to
waive the right "provided that the person has given his agreement,
in writing or on tape, to be interviewed without receiving legal
154
advice."
Under the Code, if a solicitor arrives at the police station to
see an accused, the accused must be informed of this. In addition,
the accused must be asked whether he wishes to see the solicitor.
This applies even if the accused has already declined legal

147. Kenneth Oxford, The Power to Police Effectively, in THE POLICE: POWERS,
PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES 7, at 71 (John Beynon & Colin Bourn eds., 1986).
148. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at paras. 4.87,4.91,3.107.
149. Sanders, supra note 94, at 805.
150. PACE, art. 58 (1).
151. The duty solicitor schemes were originally provided for in section 59 of PACE,
which enabled the Law Society to establish such schemes. From April 1989, the scheme
has been governed by the Duty Solicitor Arrangements 1989 that replaced the Legal Aid
(Duty Solicitor) Scheme 1988. See ZANDER, supra note 4, at 107-08.
152. PACE, art. 58 (4).
153. See id. art. 58 (2).
154. INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 111, at para. 6.6. Under Annex D, a suspect
who wishes to decline a lawyer and dictate a statement to a police officer shall:
be asked to read it and to make any correction, alterations or additions he
wishes. When he has finished certificate at the end of the statement: 'I have
read the above statement, and I have been able to correct, alter or add anything
I wish. This statement is true. I have made it my own free will.'
lIdAnnex D, para. 6.
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service. 155 The right to legal advice encompasses the actual
presence of the solicitor during interrogation and, 156 not merely the
opportunity to consult before questioning begins. In addition, the
Code ensures that "[n]o attempt should be made to dissuade the
suspect from obtaining legal advice."' 157 If a specific solicitor is
158
unavailable, the duty solicitor is provided.
Under PACE, only an officer of superintendent rank or
higher may authorize a delay in access to counsel, but they may
only do so for suspects detained for "serious arrestable
offense[s].'

1 59

160
The maximum period of delay is thirty-six hours.

Section 58(8) outlines circumstances that authorize a delay of
access to legal advice. A delay can only be authorized where the
authorizing officer has reasonable grounds to believe that exercising
the right to access counsel at that time
(a) will lead to interference with or harm to evidence connected
with a serious arrestable offence or interference with; or (b)
[will] physical[ly] injur[e] other persons; or will lead to the
alerting of other persons suspected of having committed such
an offence but not yet arrested for it; or (c) will hinder the
recovery161of any property obtained as a result of such an
offence.
2. Caution
As recommended by the Royal Commission, 162 the
Interrogation Code provides that suspects must be cautioned that
questions asked "for the purpose of obtaining evidence may be
given to a court in prosecution."
The caution must be

155. See id. at para. 6.15.
156. See id. at para. 6.8. "Where a person has been permitted to consult a solicitor and
the solicitor is available (i.e., present at the station or on his way to the station or easily
accessible by telephone) at the time the interview begins or is in progress, he must be
allowed to have his solicitor present while he is interviewed." Id
157. Id. at para. 6.4.
158. See id. at para. 6B.
159. PACE, art. 58 (6).
160. See id. art. 58 (5).
161. Id. art. 58(8). More recently, section 58 (8)(A) was added to authorize a delay of
access to legal advice in case of "drug trafficking offence" where "the officer has reasonable
grounds for believing that the detained person has benighted from drug trafficking, and that
the recovery of the value of that person's proceeds of drug trafficking will be hindered by the
exercise of the right." Id art 58(8)(A); see also INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 111, at
para. 6.6.
162. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at para. 4.110.
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administered before questioning. 163 Prior to April 1995, the
caution was similar to the United States' Miranda warning which
states that, "[y]ou do not have to say anything unless you wish to
do so, but what you say may be given in evidence."' 164 The
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994, however, replaced
this statement with a new provision. It states, "You do not have to
say anything. But it may harm your defense if you do not mention
when questioned something which you later rely on in court.
165
Anything you do say may be given in evidence."
When a person is not under arrest, the questioner must
inform that person that (i) he is not under arrest, (ii) he has no
duty to remain with the police, and (iii) he is free to leave at any
time. 166 When arrested, suspects must receive the caution unless
doing so is impractical by reason of the suspect's condition or
behavior. 167 Unlike Miranda, the Code only requires that the
caution be given by the time the suspect arrives at the police station.
Additionally, the Code requires questioning to cease entirely when
a suspect invokes the right to counsel or the right to silence.
D. Tape Recording
To prevent disputes over the admissibility and accuracy of
statements, the Interrogation Code requires police to record each
interview with a suspect. 168 This is true whether or not the
interview takes place at a police station. Thus, the tape recording of
interviews created significant debates.
Initially, the police strongly opposed the idea, even though
both the CLRC and the Royal Commission recommended limited
170
tape recording.169 After a series of successful field trials,
163. See INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 111, at para. 10.1. If questions are asked
for other purposes, such as determining a suspect's identity or his ownership of any vehicle
or the need to search him in the exercise of powers of stop and search, the caution is not
necessary. See id.
164. INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 111, at para. 10.4 (prior to Apr. 1995). Minor
deviations from this wording do not constitute a breach of this requirement. See id. The
following Notes provide that the officer should explain the caution in his own words if the
suspect does not understand the meaning of the caution. See id. at n.10C. If the suspect is
unclear about the caution's significance, the officer should explain the principle of the
right to remain silent and the effect of doing so. See id at n.10D.
165. Id. at para. 10.4 (revised from Apr. 10, 1995). See infra notes 300-03.
166.' See id. at para. 10.2.
167. See id. at para. 10.3.
16& See INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 111, at para. 11.5(a).
169. See CLRC REPORT, supra note 58, at para. 51; ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT,
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however, the police attitude toward tape recording rapidly changed.
The police realized that tape recording reduces the complaints
about the reliability, or truth, of alleged confessions. Tape
recording also allowed officers to return to what they regarded as
could be put under pressure by
real interviewing, where suspects 171
persistent and incisive questioning.
172
This change is reminiscent of the "vanishingly small cost" of
Miranda and the shift of the police's attitude on Miranda in the
United States. 173 Home Office research showed that "[t]here
appears to be no evidence to suggest that tape-recording inhibits
suspects from confessing or making damaging admissions; nor do
of information about
the results suggest any decrease in the amount
' 174
other offences obtained during interview."

supra note 90, at paras. 4.26-4.27.
170. See John Baldwin, The Police and Tape Recorders, CRIM. L. REV. 695, 698-703
(1985).
171. See Colin Bourn, Conclusion: the Police and the Acts and the Public, in THE
POLICE: POWER, PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES 7, at 288; Maurice Buck, Questioning
the Suspect, in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES 7, at 161; David
Dixon, Politics,Research and Symbolism in CriminalJustice: The Right of Silence and the
Police and CriminalEvidence Act, 20 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 27,46 (1991).
172. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's PracticalEffect Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 516-47 (1996). But see Paul G.
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 43738 (1996).
173. See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 645 (1996). As Richard A. Leo concluded, the majority of Miranda
impact studies share two propositions:
[Flirst, that the requirement of pre-interrogation Miranda warnings has
exercised only a negligible effect on the ability of police to elicit confessions,
solve crimes, and secure convictions, and; second, that the Miranda decision did
not achieve its goal of lessening the psychological pressures of police
interrogations or reducing police reliance on confession evidence.
Id. He observed that Miranda has become endurable to police gradually and the
resistance of the law enforcement authorities against Miranda has decreased. He analyzes
that the law enforcement community has successfully adapted itself to Miranda's
requirement "by fashioning strategies-such as the use of conditioning, de-emphasizing,
and persuasion-to predispose suspects to voluntarily waive their rights, thus minimizing
the potential obstacle that Miranda presents to their custodial questioning practices." Id.
at 665. Then the Miranda warnings to the suspect became a formal thing like "a warning
from a cigarette label." Id. at 659. Then, neither the International Association of Chiefs
of Police nor the National District Attorneys Association joined Attorney General
Meese's call to overturn Miranda, and rather many police chiefs hail the virtues of
Miranda and no longer question its legitimacy. Id. at 666.
174. See CAROLE F. WILLIS, THE TAPE-RECORDING OF POLICE INTERVIEWS WITH
SUSPECTS: AN INTERIM REPORT, London: HMSO, 1984 (Home Office Research Study
No. 82), at 32.
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Parliament proposed a full-scale system of tape recording the
entire interrogation procedure. This was embodied in section 60 of
PACE. 175 In 1988, the Secretary of State issued the Code of
Recording which governs the tape recording of
Practice on Tape
76
interrogations.1
E. Conclusion-PACEas a Compromise and Its Impact
With regard to police power to stop, arrest, search-and-seize,
and detain, PACE provides a number of "enabling rules." These
rules effectuate policies the police desire. PACE also includes the
"legitimizing rules" which bring the rules in line with pre-existing
as a new
police practice.177 As a result, the libertarians saw PACE
178
legal scheme biased towards "policing by coercion."
On the other hand, PACE also provides many "inhibitory
rules" that address suspects' rights to legal advice, silence, and
entitlement detention review. These rules restrain the police from
following their previous working practices. 179 Thus, the law and
order lobbyists complained that the rules were anomalous, and an
"over-provision of 'safeguards,' which could be exploited by the
criminal. "180
It is hard to find "the fulcrum between police powers and
citizens' rights."'181 PACE serves as a compromise between crime
control and due process values. As a result, PACE received "the

175. See HOME OFFICE, THE CODE OF TAPE RECORDING (1988).

176. See id
177. See SANDERS & YOUNG, supra note 129, at 21.
178. See generally LOUISE CHRISTIAN, POLICING BY COERCION (1983); Mike
Brogden, Stopping the People- Crime Control Versus Social Control, in POLICE: THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMUNITY, supra note 47. Ole Hansen stated:
[T]he Act does add a new element which is that it makes it easier for the police

to carry out practices which were previously not enshrined in statute. The
legislation gives the go ahead-the green light-to police practices and
behaviours which are likely to prove counter-productive in terms of good
policing and tackling crime. The safeguards . . . seem likely to prove largely
illusory. They are mainly bureaucratic form-filling and will prove irksome to
police officers but they are not real controls or real safeguards for the general
public.
Ole Hansen, A Balanced Approach?, in THE POLICE: THE POWERS, PROCEDURES AND
PROPRIETIES 7, at 111 (John Benyin & Colin Bourn eds. 1986).

179. SANDERS & YOUNG, supra note 129, at 21.
180. Buck, supra note 171, at 163.
181. John Beyon, Powers and Proprieties in the Police Station, in THE POLICE:
POWERS, PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES 7, at 120 (John Benyon & Colin Bourn eds.
1986).
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apparently irreconcilable complaints from civil libertarians about
the extension of police powers and from police officers about their
limitation."182 Michael Zander discussed:
Theoretically it is possible that either the police or the civil
liberties lobby might recognise that the criminal justice system
was so unbalanced in favour of their own interests that it
required radical redress in the opposite direction. But such a
situation is in practice pure fantasy. Each has for a long time
been firmly convinced that the balance is seriously wrong and
requires redress in the direction of its own preferred values. In
order for each to feel that the package is fair, it must be brought
to accept that there are a large number of changes that are
being made which adopt the values to which it subscribes. If
the number is sufficiently large it may then be able to swallow
a substantial number of changes
the notion that there are also183
that assist the 'opposing side.'
PACE, however, resulted in important changes to pre-PACE
practice. Studies reported that after PACE, most suspects are read
their rights, virtually no suspects are overtly denied access to legal
advice when requested, and the number of requests for legal advice
Both police and suspects
have dramatically increased. 184
acknowledge and accept the new system enacted by PACE.
Nonetheless, problems still remain. First, most officers do not
record the stops and the searches, and they generally treat records
185
as mere paperwork. Some forms are completed tautologically.
Second, despite the guaranteed right to legal advice and
187
silence, 186 a great majority of suspects fail to exercise those rights.
182. Dixon, supra note 171, at 32 (emphasis in original).
183. Michael Zander, Determining Whether the Act Achieves the Right Balance, 1985
PUBLIC LAW 402, 404-05.
184. See D. BROWN, DETENTION AT THE POLICE STATION UNDER THE PACE ACT
(Home Office Research Study No. 104, 1989), at 21; A. SANDERS ET AL., ADVICE AND
ASSISTANCE AT POLICE STATIONS AND THE 24-HOUR DUTY SOLICITOR SCHEME ch. 3

(Lord Chancellor's Department, 1989); A. K. BOTrOMLEY ET AL., THE IMPACT OF
ASPECTS OF THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT ON POLICING IN A FORCE IN

THE NORTH OF ENGLAND 114-20 (Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice,
University of Hull, 1989).
185. See DAVID J. SMITH & JEREMY GRAY, POLICE AND PEOPLE IN LONDON, VOL.
IV, THE POLICE IN ACTION 236 (1983); D. Dixon, et al., Reality and Rules in the
Construction and Regulation of Police Suspicion, 17 INT'L J. SOC. L. 185, 200-01 (1989); D.
Dixon et al., Consent and the Legal Regulating of Policing, 17 J.L. & SOC. 345, 348-49
(1990); SANDERS & YOUNG, supra note 129, at 51-55.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 286-87.
187. See SANDERS & YOUNG, supra note 129, at 38-39. See D. Dixon et al.,
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The availability, promptness and quality of legal advice by
188
solicitors remain lacking.
Third, police behavior in interrogation changed, but not in the
way intended by PACE. Andrew Sanders and Lee Bridges
observe:
Instead of habitually breaking the law by failing to read rights..
. they now habitually bend it by reading rights incoherently and
by failing to inform suspects that legal advice is free. And
instead of simply refusing access outright they have a graded
response: from incoherent reading of rights (bending) to other
ploys aimed at discouragement (bending), failing to record
requests and make calls (breaking), persuasion to cancel
requests (bending) and dubious informal interrogation practices
(bending and breaking). 189
Sanders and Bridges conclude that "[o]nly the manner in
which the police secure their goals-putting maximum pressure on
the suspects who matter most to them-has changed. Police
misconduct has probably not been reduced. Most likely, it has
been made less overt, and hence more difficult to detect and
control." 190
This phenomenon demonstrates that, similar to Miranda in
the United States, the "inhibitory rules" in PACE often turn out to
be the "presentational rules." 19 1 The expectation that police and
suspects would automatically change their practices as a result of
reformation is misplaced. Furthermore, reliance on this "legalistic
notion"'192 is unfounded.
Criminal justice is a social as well as a legal institution.
"Negotiated justice"'193 oriented toward obtaining guilty pleas 194

Safeguarding the Rights of Suspects in Police Custody, in 1 POLICING AND SOCIETY 11540 (1990); Dixon, supra note 171, at 45; A. SANDERS ET AL., supra note 184, at ch. 4; D.
BROWN, supra note 184, at 21.
188. See Dixon, supra note 171, at 43-45; A. SANDERS ET AL., supra note 184, at ch. 4;
Sanders & Bridges, The Right to Legal Advice, in JUSTICE IN ERROR, supra note 64, at 4652.
189. Andrew Sanders & Lee Bridges, Access to Legal Advice and Police Malpractice,
CRIM. L. REV. 494, 506 (1990).
190. Id
191. See SANDERS & YOUNG, supra note 129, at 21.
192. David Dixon, Common Sense, Legal Advice and the Right to Silence, 1991 PUB. L.
233,253 (1991).
193. See JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, NEGOTIATED JUSTICE:
PRESSURE TO PLEAD GUILTY (C.M. Campbell & P.N. P. Wiles eds. 1977). David Dixon
stated: "[C]riminal justice should rather be conceived as a fluid process whose currency is

290
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and police practice based on the "cop culture"' 195 do not easily
change.
Therefore, PACE's "instrumental value in either
controlling crime or controlling the police" is still in
196
controversy.
The meaningful contribution of PACE and the Codes of
Practice, however, should not be overlooked. As Robert Reiner
states, the crucial significance of PACE is that "it introduces a
greater (if imperfect) degree of rationalisationin an area where as
the Home Secretary has rightly said 'the present state of the law is
unclear and contains many indefensible anomalies."'' 197
A
Conservative MP also stated "[t]he basis of the Act [PACE] is said
to be founded on compromise,... this legislation seeks to codify
and control an area which lacked clarity and was becoming an
'198
increasing scandal. In that respect it is successful.
Although the police cannot explicitly reject the new system,
they can tacitly distort it. Although the new system alone cannot
enhance the guarantee of an individual's procedural rights, it does
provide legal grounds for individual suspects to challenge police
misconduct. PACE and the Codes of Practice certainly opened a
new stage of the English criminal justice system.

negotiation, compromise and arrangement in the administration of cases within a system,
the essential point- of which is not the contested trial but the guilty plea .... ." More
generally, the failure to consider how rules actually operate entailed not properly
considering a crucial, continuing practice in policing the achievement of objectives by
obtaining "consent" rather than by using legal power. See Dixon, supra note 192, at 253.
194. According to the official statistics, approximately two-thirds of all Crown Court
defendants give up their rights to trial by jury. The statistics treat a case as disposed of by
guilty plea only if guilty pleas are entered by all co-defendants, if any. See JUDICIAL
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1996 (Lord Chancellor's Department), Cmnd. 3716, at 64,
Tl. 6.7. Thus, the rate of guilty pleas will be higher if cases where not all co-defendants
entered guilty pleas are included.
195. See REINER, supra note 67, at ch. 3.
196. See REINER, supra note 53, at 402.
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. David Ashby, Safeguarding the Suspect in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES
AND PROPRIETIES 7, at 183, 188 (John Benyon & Colin Bourn eds., 1986) (emphasis
added).
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V. THE ENGLISH COURTS' VOLTE-FACE TOWARD ROBUST

EXCLUSION AFTER PACE

PACE provides prosecutors with "three hurdles" 199 for
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence: (1) the oppression hurdle,
(2) the unreliability hurdle in section 76(2), and (3) the fairness
hurdle in section 78. Post-PACE, English courts abandoned their
past reluctance to exercise their discretion to exclude unlawfully
obtained evidence, either confessional or non-confessional
evidence.
A. Mandatory Exclusion of Confession by Section 76(2) Unreliability Test
Section 76(2) of PACE provides the oppression hurdle and
the unreliability hurdle. It provides for mandatory exclusion of
confessions obtained (a) "by oppression" or (b) "in consequence
or done which was likely" to render a confession
of anything said
"unreliable." 2°° When subsection (a) or (b) is alleged, the
prosecution has the burden to rebut the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt. 20 1 Section 76(2) rejects the Royal Commission's
proposal that the traditional voluntariness test be abandoned
altogether. Rather, it accepts the "reliability principle" of the
CLRC Report.
An overlap between the two hurdles exists. Oppression likely
consists of something said or done that renders a confession
According to Di Birch, "some basic minimum
unreliable.
standards are not negotiable, and courts cannot entertain
arguments based on the reliability of evidence obtained in an
oppressive way without descending to the level of the
202
oppressor."
Section 76(2)(a) defines oppression to include "torture,
inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of violence

199. See Di Birch, The Pace Hots Up: Confessions and Confusions Under the 1984 Act,
CRIM. L. REV. 95, 99 (1989). Besides the three hurdles, article 82(3) "saves pre-existing

common law powers . . . to exclude evidence whose prejudicial effect outweighed its
probative value." PACE, art. 82(3).
200. PACE, art. 76 (2)
201. See id.
202. Birch, supra note 199.
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(whether or not amounting to torture). ' 20 3 English courts
maintained a restrictive interpretation of the terms and held
"oppression" to its ordinary dictionary meaning. 2° 4 In Regina v.
Miller,20 5 for instance, the defendant, a paranoid schizophrenic,
initially confessed to killing his girlfriend and later tried to retract
his confession. The defendant argued that he confessed during an
oppressive interview that caused him to suffer an episode of
schizophrenic terror. The Court of Appeal, however, held that
although the questions were asked deliberately with the intention
of producing a disordered state of mind, the mere fact that the
questions triggered hallucinations in the defendant does not
provide evidence of oppression "within the ordinary meaning of
'20 6
that word.
In section 76(2)(b), PACE uses the language "in consequence
of anything said or done which was likely... to render unreliable
confession" instead of the words "threat or inducement" as in the
CLRC Report. As Peter Mirfield points out, section 76(2)(b) is
"capable of being far more revolutionary in its effect ' 20 7 because
"[t]he police, during investigation, may say to or do to the suspect
many things which do not amount to threats or inducements." 208 In
such a case, the judge should consider whether the reliability test is
satisfied. Mark Berger stated:
The most logical reading of the standard is that it asks the court
to make an objective assessment of what consequences would
be expected from the circumstances surrounding the
questioning, regardless of whether the particular confession is
itself reliable. If the statement is likely to be unreliable because
of the condition which led to the suspect to make it, it should be

203. PACE, art. 76(8).
204. See Regina v. Miller, 1 W.L.R. 1191, 1200-01 (1986).
205. See id
206. Id. at 1201. In Regina v. Fulling, 2 W.L.R. 923 (C.A. 1987), the defendant initially
refused to answer police questions, but she confessed after being told that her lover had been
having an affair with another woman held in the next cell. Although the defendant
challenged the admissibility of her confession claiming that she had been the victim of
oppressive conduct by the police, the Court of Appeal rejected the claim, ruling that the
word "oppression" should be given in its dictionary definition as the "[e]xercise of authority
or power in a burdensome, harsh, or wrongful manner; unjust or cruel treatment of subjects,
inferiors, etc.; the imposition of unreasonable or unjust burdens." Id. at 928 (quoting the
Oxford English Dictionary).
207.

MIRFIELD, supra note 22, at 111.

208. Id
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20 9
excluded even if corroboration of its content is available.

After PACE, the courts, in several cases, ruled. confessions to
2 10
be inadmissible due to their unreliability. In Regina v. Phillips,
the Court of Appeal excluded the defendant's confession because it
was made as a result of the police's explicit inducement. 21 1 In
Regina v. Harvey,2 12 the Court excluded the defendant's confession
to a murder in the presence of her lesbian lover. The defendant
possessed a low I.Q. and suffered from a psychopathic disorder.
The other woman confessed first but later retracted the confession.
The judge said that the prosecution had not met the burden of proof

213
regarding the reliability of the confession.
In Regina v. Delaney,214 the Court of Appeal quashed a
conviction of an indecent assault of a three-year old girl based on
the defendant's psychologically weak admissions. The court
emphasized that the police violated the Interrogation Code by
failing to make a contemporaneous note of the conversation with
the defendant, thereby depriving the court of information as to
exactly what transpired. 215 The court concluded that the trial judge
did not consider the impact of the defendant's long-term treatment
on the reliability of his statement. 216 In Regina v. Trussler,217 the
judge in Crown Court excluded the confession of a drug addict
because he had been in police custody for eighteen hours without
any rest. The trial judge excluded the confession as unreliable,
emphasizing that extended questioning without rest breached the
provision of the Interrogation Code that requires the suspect to be

209.. Mark Berger, The Exclusionary Rule and Confession Evidence:
Some
Perspectives on Evolving Practices and Policies in the United States and England and
Wales, 20 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 63,72 (1991) (emphasis in original).
210. See Regina v. Phillips, 86 Crim. App. 18 (1987). In Directorof Public Prosecutions
v. Blake, 89 Crim. App. 179 (Q.B. Div'l Ct 1988), the Court of Appeal excluded a juvenile
defendant's confession to a fire at the hostel. Although the defendant initially refused to
locate her estranged father at the interview and sought a social worker, the police eventually
secured the presence of her father. Given the earlier steadfast resistance of the child to the
presence of her father, and out of concern that an estranged parent would not be able to
fulfill the goal of ensuring a fair interview of the child, the court concluded that the spirit of
the Interrogation Code had been violated. See id. at 186.
211. See iL at 23.
212. See Regina v. Harvey, Crim. App. 241 (1988).
213. Id
214. See Regina v. Delaney, 88 Crim. App. 338 (1988).
215. See id. at 341-42.
216. See id. at 343.
217. See Regina v. Trussler, Crim. App. 446 (1988).
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given at least eight hours rest in any twenty-four hour period. 218
B. Rigorous Exercise of Discretionfor Exclusion by Section
78(1) - Unfairness Test
In addition to the double hurdle in section 76(2), section 78(1)
grants judges the ability to exercise a fairness-based discretion. 219
Based on the "protective principle," the section provides that "the
court may refuse to allow evidence... if it appears to the court
that ... the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse
effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to
admit it."' 220 Although there is an argument that section 78 is
intended to apply only to non-confessional evidence, there is
nothing in section 78 to suggest such a restrictive interpretation.
As a result, it is interpreted to provide a general discretion to
221
exclude all unreliable evidence.
The new statutory discretion resembled the old common law
discretion. While it was possible that the judges might interpret
the section as narrowly as before PACE, the consequence of
section 78(1) has been quite different. 222
1. Physical Evidence Obtained from Unlawful Search-and-Seizure
Although the Royal Commission recommended an
"obligatory exclusion" of evidence from an illegal search and
seizure, 2 23 the
Conservative
government
rejected
the
recommendation. Subsequently, Lord Scarman, although he was
part of the majority in Sang, initiated an amendment that
introduced "a Scottish-style reverse onus exclusionary rule. ' ' 224
The amendment gave the courts discretion to exclude illegally
obtained evidence unless the prosecution could prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that it was lawfully obtained, or that the illegality
was of no material significance, or that the overriding interest of
justice required that it be allowed in as evidence. 225

218 See id. at 448.
219. PACE, art. 78(1).
220. Id. art. 78.
221. See Peter Mirfield, The Future of the Law of Confession, CRIM. L. REV. 63, 71
(1984); Birch, supra note 199, at 97.
222. See FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 429; ZANDER, supra note 4, at 201.
223. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at para. 3.49.
224.

FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 427.

225. The final form of the Scarman amendment was as follows:

1999]

English CriminalJustice System

295

The government rejected Lord Scarman's amendment and
replaced it with Lord Chancellor's and Lord Hailsham's
amendment designed to return to the common law position before
Sang.226 Section 78(1) was then adopted, "open to further
development by the courts-who in their turn may yet come to
227
regret the absence of the specifics of the Scarman clause."
English courts readily exercise their Section 78 power and
exclude evidence for various reasons. For example, in Matto v.
D.P.P.,228 the Division Court suppressed the breath specimen of a
suspect and quashed a conviction for driving with excess alcohol
because the police, in their efforts to administer the breath test,
engaged in misconduct (malafides) on the defendant's property. 229
Similarly, in Chapman v. D.P.P.,230 the court quashed a conviction
for assaulting a police officer because the police entered the
defendant's apartment in pursuit of a fleeing suspect without
reasonable suspicion that the suspect had committed any
arrestable offense. 231 Likewise, in The Queen v. Fennelley,232 a
trial for possession of narcotics with intent to distribute, the trial
judge suppressed evidence of the narcotics because the police
violated PACE section 2(3) by not informing the suspect as to why
he was stopped and about to be searched.233

If it appears to the court in any proceedings that any evidence (other than a
confession) proposed to be given by the prosecution that may have been
obtained improperly, the court shall not allow the evidence to be given unlessthe prosecution proves to the court beyond a reasonable doubt that it was
obtained lawfully ...or the court is satisfied that anything improperly done in
obtaining it was of no material significance in all the circumstances of the case
and ought, therefore, to be disregarded; or the court is satisfied that the
probative value of the evidence, the gravity of the offence charged, and the
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained are such that the public
interest in the fair administration of the criminal law requires the evidence to be
given, notwithstanding that it was obtained improperly.
4 PARL. DEB., H.L. 430 (1984).
226. See id. at 427-28; ZANDER, supra note 4, at 199-200.
227. Paul Sieghart, Sanctions Against Abuse of Police Powers, 1985 PUB. L. 440,446.
22& See Matto v. D.P.P., Crim. L. Rev. 641 (1987).
229. See id
230. See Chapman v. D.P.P., Crim. L. Rev. 843 (1988).
231. See id
232. See The Queen v. Fennelley, Crim. L. Rev. 142 (1989).
233. See id
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In Regina v. Taylor,234 a case involving financial
improprieties, the trial judge suppressed documentary evidence
due to police misconduct, irrespective of any concerns about
reliability. The police, in their application for a subpoena, had
misled the judge into believing that the investigation concerned
235
drug trafficking.
2. Confessions Obtained from Breach of the Right to Legal
Advice
The main issue in cases regarding the right to legal advice is
whether any delay in obtaining a solicitor for the accused is justified
as being reasonable. The English courts have routinely exercised
their fairness-based discretion under section 78(1) of PACE to
exclude confessions obtained as a result of breaching section 58 of
PACE.
The leading case is Regina v. Samuel,236 which "showed that
the courts were prepared to enforce the provisions of section 58
with an unexpected degree of vigour." 237 The defendant in Samuel,
after waiving his right to counsel, denied his involvement in an
armed robbery. After a search of the defendant's home uncovered
stolen items, he asked for his solicitor. Additionally, upon learning
of the charges, the defendant's solicitor sought access to his client.
A superintendent at the police station, however, denied the access
because serious arrestable offenses were involved and there was a
likelihood of inadvertent warning of accomplices. 238
The
defendant, subsequently, confessed. Only after the defendant
confessed was the solicitor allowed to see his client. The Court
quashed the conviction because the police unjustifiably delayed the
defendant's right to legal advice.
The court's analysis in Samuel begins with referring to
paragraph one of Annex B to the Interrogation Code. First, the
court pointed out that the police were unjustified in denying a
suspect access to a solicitor after he was charged, even though other
charges were still being investigated.239 Second, emphasizing that

234. See Manchester Crown Court, Ex P. Taylor, 1 W.L.R. 705 (D.C. 1988); Barclay
Bank pic v. Taylor, 1 W.L.R. 1066 (C.A. 1989).
235. See id.
236. See Regina v. Samuel, 1 Q.B. 615 (C.A. 1987).
237. ZANDER, supra note 4, at 115.
23& See Samuel, 1 Q.B. at 618.
239. INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 112, parcel Annex B.
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the right of access to a solicitor is "one of the most important and
fundamental rights of a citizen," 240 the court stated that denying
access to a solicitor because accomplices may be alerted was an
insufficient reason for denial. The court concluded that the more
probable reason for the denial was to give the police one last chance
to interview the defendant without a solicitor present. The court
observed that the defendant's solicitor would have advised silence
because his client had already strenuously denied involvement and
because the police had filed two serious charges. Therefore, the
court concluded that in all probability the police would not have
obtained incriminating information from the defendant if he had
consulted with the solicitor. 241 The court quashed the conviction
because the trial judge should have exercised his discretion to
242
exclude the confession.
The trial judge in Regina v. Davidson243 and the Court of
245
Appeal in Regina v. Parris244 and Regina v. Mary Quayson
followed Samuel, and excluded confessions based on breach of
section 58.246 The case law is now summarized in two new guidance
notes to Annex B of the Interrogation Code which state:
[T]he officer may authorize delaying access to a solicitor only if
he has reasonable grounds to believe that that specific solicitor
will, inadvertently or otherwise, pass on a message from the
detained person which lead to an any of the three results in
paragraph 1 coming out. In these circumstances the officer
should offer the detained person access to a solicitor on the

The right set out in section 5 or 6 or both in the Code or both may be delayed if
the person is in police detention in connection with a serious arrestable offence,
has not yet been charged with an offence and an officer of the rank of
superintendent or above has reasonable grounds for believing that ....
Id.(emphasis added).
240. See Samuel, 1 Q.B. at 630.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See Regina v. Davidson, Crim. L. Rev. 442 (1988).
244. See Regina v. Parris, Crim. L. Rev. 214 (1989).
245. See Regina v. Mary Quayson, Crim. L. Rev. 218 (1989).
246. The exclusion, however, is not automatic but discretionary. In Regina v. Alladice, 87
Crim. App. 380 (1988), the Court of Appeal did not exclude the suspect's confession
although it found the breach of section 58. Given the fact the suspect had been cautioned,
his statement that he could cope with the interview and his comment that he only wanted a
solicitor to check the conduct of the police, the court concluded that the presence of the
solicitor would not have made any difference to the suspect's knowledge of his rights and
there was no link between the absence of the solicitor and the admission.
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247
Duty Solicitor Scheme.
The fact that the ground for delaying notification of arrest
under paragraph 1 above may be satisfied does not automatically
mean that the grounds for delaying access to legal access will also be
satisfied. 2
Similar to the U.S. Burger-Rehnquist Supreme Courts revival
of the Massiah rule,249 the English courts actively protect a
suspect's right to counsel. It is argued that "[t]he burden of
authority is such that other than in certain categories of offences it is
for the police to justify the prevention of
now virtually impossible
250
stage."
any
at
access

3. Confessions Obtained without a Caution
The English courts have also exercised their discretion to
exclude confessions obtained when the defendant was251not
informed of his or her rights. There are several leading cases.
In Regina v. Absolam,252 the Court of Appeal quashed a
conviction for supplying cannabis because the defendant was not
informed of his right to have a solicitor present and the interview
was not recorded. The trial judge held that the suspect was only
entitled to legal advice "as soon as practicable," as required by
section 58(4), and that the series of questions and answers did not
amount to an interview. The Court of Appeal, however, held that
section 58(4) did not relate to the suspect's right to be advised of
247. INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 111, Annex B, n.B4.
248. Id. at n.B5.
249. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Massiah rule "not only
survived, but flourished" in the "conservative" Courts. Carol S. Steiker, CounterRevolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 2466, 2475 (1996). In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the Court not only
reaffirmed but also significantly expanded the Massiah rule, that is, it broadened the
definition of "deliberate elicitation" of incriminating statements, then the "Christian burial
speech" constituted the elicitation. In United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), the Cout
held that the use of a paid informant who engaged in conversations with the incarcerated
defendant violated the Sixth Amendment and the defendant's incriminating statements
were "deliberately elicited" even though the informant had been instructed "not to initiate
any conversation with or question" the defendant. See also Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.
159 (1985).
250. David Wolchover & Anthony Heaton-Armstrong, The Questioning Code
Revamped, CRIM. L. REV. 232,234 (1991).
251. In Regina v. Hughes, however, the Court of Appeal sustained the admission of
confession after the police had mistakenly told a suspect, after the suspect's request, that a
duty solicitor was not available. See Crim. L. Rev. 519 (1991).
252. See Regina v. Absolam, 88 Crim, App. 332 (1989).
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his right to legal advice immediately upon detention.
Furthermore, the interrogation constituted an interview within the
meaning of the Code because it was conducted by the police to
obtain an admission upon which criminal proceedings could
commence.
In Regina v. Vernon,253 the defendant signed the custody form
requesting a solicitor. When a solicitor was not available, the
defendant agreed to be interviewed, during which time she made
admissions. The trial judge at Inner London Crown Court
excluded the interview because the defendant was not advised of
the duty solicitor scheme.
C. Conclusion- "Revolution" Based on Legislation
As the Royal Commission pointed out, the English criminal
justice system retains features distinct from those of the United
States. For example, "the police are less fragmented than in the
United States; there is a common discipline code for all forces;
there are national representative bodies and a single Minister with
responsibilities for the police service at national level; and there is
a central inspectorate." 254 In comparison to the U.S. adversary
system, the English system is far less party-influenced and more
hierarchically-controlled. 255 The difference in the legal culture is
also observed. Inga Markovits states:
Americans view the state with suspicion and the law as their
shield against official transgressions. They expect "total
justice": compensation for every harm suffered, observance of
due process when their rights are at stake ....The English, on
the other hand, do not yet seem to define themselves as holders
of rights nor do they view their interactions with others as legal
relationships . . . . If Americans want "total justice,"
expectations of justice in Britain, according to one English
observer, are at best "patchy." "Due process" is not a term
which features in an English lawyer's256
daily vocabulary, nor is it
part of a layman's demands upon life.

253. See Regina v. Vernon, Crim. L. Rev. 445 (1988).
254. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90, at paras. 4.126-4.127. See also Van
Kessel, supra note 59, at 130-31.
255. See Robert A. Kagan, American Lawyers, Legal Culture, and Adversary Legalism,
in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 9 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N.
Scheiber eds., 1996).
256. See The King v. Warckshall, 1 Leach C.C., at 1324-25 (footnotes omitted).
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These differences caused PACE not to adopt the "disciplinary
principle," although the "reliability principle" and the "protective
principle" are explicitly expressed as grounds for the exclusionary
rule in section 76(2) and 78(1). Since the 1960s, however, "the
traditional equanimity with which the British have viewed their
system of justice has been undermined by declining public
confidence in the police and worsening police-community
relations." 257 Furthermore, "English courts now confront many of
the same tensions between 'law and order' and personal liberty
which [Americans] have faced for decades." 258 At the same time,
remedies for police misconduct, such as civil and criminal actions,
259
are ineffective.
After PACE, the English courts have tacitly accepted the
"disciplinary principle" in their initiative. David Feldman stated:
The judges in the Crown Courts and the Court of Appeal seem
to have moved away from the traditional notion that it is not
the judiciary's job to discipline the police. They treat the
regulation of police practices as being at least as important an
objective as procedural fairness in the criminal process .... It
shows that the judges now see themselves as having a
disciplinary and regulatory role in maintaining the balance
between the powers of the police and the protection of suspects.
This balance was one of the fundamental elements in the
deliberations of the Phillips Commission and of
parliamentarians debating the various versions of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Bill. In order to maintain this balance, judge
appear to feel that they must impress on the police the
importance
of the protective provisions in PACE and the
260
Codes.
The English courts' use of their discretionary exclusion after
PACE is extraordinary. 261 According to Michael Zander's

257. Van Kessel, supra note 59, at 9.
258. Id.
259. See SANDERS & YOUNG, supra note 129, at 395-413.
260. David Feldman, Regulating Treatment of Suspects in Police Stations: Judicial
Interpretationof Detention Provisions in the Police and CriminalEvidence Act 1984, CRIM.
L. REV. 452, 468-70 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
261. In 1981, McConville and Baldwin observed that: "The situation [with respect to
police interrogation] is ... more favorable to the accused in the United States where the
courts have strived in recent years to give meanings to his rights. In the absence of
corresponding efforts on the part of English courts .... " MICHAEL MCCONVILLE &
JOHN BALDWIN, COURTS, PROSECUTION AND CONVICTIONS 5,6 (1981).
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research, between January 1986 and June 1990, forty-six of the
seventy-two reported decisions that excluded evidence resulted in
victory for the defendant. 262 At trial level, twenty-six out of
twenty-eight decisions favored the defendant. 263 At the appellate
level, twenty out of forty-four were decided in favor of the
defendant. 264 Zander stated, "This is striking. Few, one imagine,
would have predicted a 'batting average' of almost fifty per cent
for the defence in the appellate cases." 265 An American law
professor called this shift a "British criminal procedure
revolution. "266
VI. DEBATE ON RIGHT TO SILENCE AND PENALIZATION OF ITS
EXERCISE BY THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ORDER ACT

1994
English courts robustly exercised the discretionary exclusion
rule under PACE until it was halted by the law and order lobby.
In 1994, as a result of the lobby efforts to abolish the right to
silence, the English Parliament passed the CJPOA. By April 1995,
the right to silence was finally "extinguished in the nation which
invented it."' 26 7
Great Britain, following the Republic of
Singapore, became the second nation to adopt the CLRC's
268
recommendation.
A. Brief Review of the Debate on the Right to Silence
The right to silence is a common law principle that "normally
tribunals of fact (juries and magistrates) should not be invited or
encouraged to conclude, either by judges or prosecutors, that a
defendant is guilty merely because he has refused to respond to
allegations, particularly from the police, or has refused to testify in
court in his own defence." 269 It has been the "golden thread
262. See ZANDER, supra note 4, at 201.
263. *Seeid.
264. See id.

265. Id. (emphasis in original).
266. Bradley, supra note 118, at 190.
267.

RONALD DWORKIN, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR BRITAIN 9 (1990).

268. In 1976, the Republic of Singapore adopted the CLRC proposal.

See Meng

Heong Yeo, Diminishingthe Right to Silence: The Singapore Experience, CRIM. L.REV. 89
(1983).
269. Steven Greer, The Right to Silence: A Review of the Current Debate, 53 MOD. L.
REV. 709,710 (1990). In Regina v. Sang, Lord Diplock stated:

The underlying rationale of this branch of the criminal law, though it may
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running through the web of English law." 270
Like the Miranda debate in the United States, the right to
silence in Great Britain "has come to symbolize the contest over
criminal justice." 271 The criticism on the right to silence can be
traced to Bentham's famous dictum: "innocence claims the right of
speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of silence." 272 Opponents
criticize the right to silence as "contrary to common sense," 273 "a
2 74
sacred cow," and an unjustifiable relic of the past.

Roger Leng summarized the main arguments of
"abolitionism" 275 as follows: (i) investigating crime and law
enforcement benefits the community as a whole; thus the state
should require citizens to cooperate and answer questions; (ii)
there is no point in preserving a right that only aids criminals in
evading justice; (iii) guilt is the only real reason for silence, thus it
is illogical to bar judges from directing juries that guilt may be
inferred from silence; (iv) protection of the right to silence may
pervert justice because it withholds cogent evidence from the jury;
and (v) the right to silence hampers investigations by precluding
the police from collecting evidence from the best source, the
27 6
suspect.

originally have been based on ensuring the reliability of confessions is, in my
view, now to be found in the maxim, nemo debetprodere se ipsum, no one can be
required to be his own betrayer, or in its popular English misinterpretation 'the
right to silence.'
2 All E.R. 1222, 1230 (1979).
270. Woolmington v. D.P.P., A.C. 462 (1935).
271. Dixon, supra note 171, at 32.
272. BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 241 (M. Dumont ed., 1825).
273. Glanville Williams, The Tactics of Silence, 137 NEW LJ. 1107 (1987). He stated:
"the so-called right to silence ... is contrary to common sense. It runs counter to our
realisation of how we ourselves would behave if we were faced with a criminal charge. If
we were innocent, we would not stay mum-except perhaps in the most unusual
circumstances." Id.
274. Sir Rupert Cross, Right to Silence and the Presumptionof Liberty-Sacred Cow or
Safeguardof Liberty, 11 J. SOC'Y. PUB. TCHRS. L. 66 (1970).
The right to silence has been seen as an anachronistic because in the past such
measures were vital to protect the accused from excesses of torture and
inquisition, associated with institutions such as the Star Chamber, but with the
procedural protections put in place since that period, its significance has
declined.
SUSAN M. EASTON, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 31 (1991).
275. Abolitionism is the term used to describe the movement encouraging abolition of
the right to silence.
276. See Roger Leng, The Right-to-Silence Debate, in SUSPICION AND SILENCE: THE
RIGHT TO SILENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 20 (1994).
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The alleged benefits of abolitionism are summarized as
follows:
Abolishing the right to silence would increase pressure on
individuals to speak, and encourage admissions and guilty pleas.
This would lead to shorter sentences and relieve pressure on
prisons, although of course this might be offset by the overall
increase in conviction of the guilty. Also, the number of nonjury trials would probably increase, which cost the public
significantly less than a jury trial .... Additionally, abolitionists
contend that additional convictions, regardless of how few in
number, will prove significant to victims and to police morale.
Finally, abolitionists argue that the most important benefit of
mandating an accused's
testimony is the testimony's
277
contribution to the truth.
Conversely, "retentionism 278 regards the right to silence as a
fundamental legal shield that protects the presumption of
innocence. Retentionists criticize abolitionism as "the tyranny of
convenience." 279 They claim that: (i) the traditional common law
does not require a citizen to incriminate him or herself; (ii) using a
suspect's silence as evidence against them effectively reduces the
prosecutions burden of proof and thereby undermines the
principle that citizens retain a presumption of innocence unless
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (iii) forcing suspects to
participate in pre-trial interviews usurps the role of a trial court as
the proper place for determining the fact; and (iv) the coercive
atmosphere of police interviews may induce vulnerable and easily
influenced suspects to incriminate themselves falsely. 280 Susan
Easton stated:
The privilege is built into the edifice of the adversarial system.
If the right to silence was lost and the defendant encouraged to
answer at risk of adverse inferences, this would shift the trial
process from an adversarial system to an inquisitorial one ....
Once comment is permitted on silence, whether in police
interrogation or at trial, then the whole focus of the trial shifts
onto the defence and assessment of its arguments, rather than
277. See EASTON, supra note 274, at 94.
278. Retentionism is the term used to describe the movement to retain the right to
silence.
279. DWORKIN, supra note 267, at 9. He stated: "Measured case-by-case against the
immediate aims of ordinary politics, the value of liberty will always seem speculative and
marginal; it will always seem academic, abstract, and dispensable." Id at 12.
280. See Leng, supra note 276, at 20.
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on the prosecution's case against the accused so it is hard to
sustain the view that the burden of proof would not be affected.
The defendant becomes the focus of attention and his account,
or failure to supply an explanation of his conduct, becomes the
centre of the trial, rather than the strength of the prosecution's
case .... Once the burden is effectively shifted by abolishing or
diluting the right to silence, then the incentive to the
search for independent evidence is weakened
prosecution to
28 1
considerably.
A number of empirical studies, before and after PACE, argue
against Ms. Easton's position on the right to silence. 2 82 Michael
Zander summarized the results of the studies as follows:
(i) The great majority of suspects in police stations do not
exercise their right to silence. All studies agree on this; (ii)
Suspects charged with serious offenses are silent in the police
station more often than suspects charged with less serious cases;
(iii) Suspects who have legal advice are more likely to be silent
in the police station than suspects who do not have legal advice;
(iv) Suspects with previous convictions are more likely to be
silent in the police station than those with no prior record; (v)
What determines whether a suspect is charged is mainly the
strength of the prosecution's evidence; (vi) Insofar as silence in
the police station has any impact on the police decision to
charge, it makes a charge more likely rather than less likely; (v)
the great majority of defendants in both the Crown Court (over
70%) and the magistrates' courts (over 90%) plead guilty,
which from this point of view makes it academic whether they
were silent in the police station; (vii) Suspects who are silent in
the police station and who plead not guilty are found about
as
28 3
often as suspects who were not silent in the police station.

281. EASTON, supra note 274, at 109-11.
282. Major pre-PACE studies are as follows: Zander, The Investigation of Crime, 9
CRIM. L. REV. 203 (1979); B. IRVING, POLICE INTERROGATION: A CASE STUDY OF
CURRENT PRACTICE (RCCP RESEARCH STUDY NO. 2, 1980); MCCONVILLE &
BALDWIN, supra note 261; B. Mitchell, Confession and Police Interrogationof Suspects,
CRIM. L. REV. 596 (1986). Major post PACE studies are as follows: J. WALKEY, POLICE
INTERROGATION (1987); A. SANDERS ET AL., Advice and Assistance at Police Stations
(1989); B. IRVING & I. MCKENZIE, POLICE INTERROGATION (1989); S. Moston et al., The

Effects of Case Characteristics on Suspect Behavior During Questioning, 32 BRIT J.
CRIMINOLOGY 23 (1992); S. Moston et al., The Incidence, Antecedents and Consequences
of the Use of the Right to Silence during Police Questioning, 3 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL
HEALTH 30 (1993).

283. Michael Zander, Abolition of the Right to Silence, in SUSPICION AND SILENCE:
THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 147-48 (David Morgan &
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Additionally, the Royal Commission report indicates that,
contrary to common sense, lawyers rarely advise silence because
most suspects experience difficulties remaining silent. 284 Also, in
practice, exercising the right to silence results in negative
consequences for suspects because juries, regardless of their
instructions, draw adverse inferences from the silence. 285 When
clients are advised to remain silent, it is "a temporary, negotiating
286
or sanctioning tactic rather than an entrenched position."
Lawyers give such instructions "to protect a particularly
vulnerable client, to sanction police malpractice, or to bargain
287
tactically with officers in exchanges of information."
Retentionists suggest that no support exists for the
abolitionist argument that allowing criminals to rely on their right
to silence sacrifices convictions. D.J. Galligan pointed out that the
research on this subject yields two different conclusions. First,
since suspects usually waive the right to silence, it has little
importance and should be abolished. Second, the public has no
reason to regard the right to silence as an obstacle to
288
investigation.
Critics of the first interpretation argue that the waivers result
from the enormous pressure exerted by the methods and
organization of the investigation. Therefore, fundamental reform
must occur to ensure that suspects make informed and voluntary
decisions. Critics of the second argument suggest that the right to
silence substantially delays the investigation. In addition, if
suspects know that the court might draw adverse inferences from
the suspect's silence, they would likely make incriminating
statements more quickly and easily. 289 "The numbers game" does
not affect the position of either lobby. 290

Geoffrey M. Stephenson eds., 1994).
284. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 90.
285. See id. at paras. 4.39, 4.48; M. ZANDER & P. HENDERSON, THE CROWN COURT
STUDY (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Research Study No. 19, 1993).
286. Dixon, supra note 192, at 234.
287. Dixon, supra note 171, at 45.
288. See DJ. Galligan, The Right to Silence Reconsidered, 41 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
69,75 (1988).
289. See id.
290. Leng, supra note 276, at 22.
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B. Victory of "Exchange Abolitionism"
As indicated above, the first round of the debate led to the
retentionist's victory. Both the Royal Commission and PACE
rejected the CLRC's 1972 proposal to abolish the right to silence.
In July 1987, however, the Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd,
reopened the debate at the annual Police Foundation Lecture.
While affirming his belief in the appropriateness of giving suspects
the right to legal advice at police stations, Hurd revived the
CLRC's proposal, stating that:
[I]n the light of changing circumstances, including the advent of
tape recording and other safeguards, it is right to consider
whether the right balance is being struck between the interests
of a person suspected of crime and the interest of society as a
whole in bringing criminals to justice ....

Is it really in the

interests of justice, for example, that experienced criminals
should be able to refuse to answer all police questions secure in
the knowledge that a jury will never hear of it? Does the
present law really protect the innocent whose interests will
generally lie in answering questions frankly? Is it really
unthinkable that the jury should be allowed to know about the
defendant's silence and, in the light of the other facts brought
to
291
light during a trial, be able to draw its own conclusion?
Hurd's announcement responded to police pressure arising
from PACE. Although PACE clarified, consolidated, extended
and balanced police power against additional suspects' rights,
"most of these police powers were already being exercised de
facto." 292 Therefore, police saw PACE, particularly the section
expounding the right to legal advice before and during
interrogation, as a constraint. 293 Additionally, the right to silence
was "politically symbolic as the territory upon which the police
seeks to regain the political ground lost in PACE. '294 Thus, the
right to silence was "crucial as an issue which symbolizes police
autonomy and professionalism." 295
Hurd's statement became what Steven Greer called
"exchange abolitionism," 296 which argues for the abolishment of
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Recited in Zander, supra note 283, at 142-43.
Dixon, supranote 171, at 32-33.
See id.
See id. at 234.
Id
Greer, supra note 269, at 719. Adrian A. Zuckerman, a leading exchange
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the right to silence in exchange for other rights, principally the
right to legal advice during a police interview. The exchange
abolitionists argue that, unlike pre-PACE, other suspects' rights
during police interrogation are sufficiently guaranteed under
PACE. 2 97 Therefore, only the guilty seek to hide behind silence at

the police station.298 Their conclusion is that PACE renders the
Internal police research
right to silence "superfluous." 299
supported this theory by noting the increased rate of suspects
right to legal representation and the right to silence
invoking the 300
PACE.
after
The criticism of exchange abolitionism that "PACE was
intended to change policing practice by increasing suspects' rights
301
as the price for formalizing and increasing certain police power"
did not prevail. In 1988, the Criminal Evidence (Northern
Ireland) Order abolished the right to silence for all suspects
arrested in Northern Ireland. In July 1989, the Home Office
Working Group published their report recommending
implementation of the CLRC's right to silence proposal and a new
caution. 30 2 Reaching the same conclusion in 1993, an eight-tothree majority of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
advised maintaining the right to silence, as its predecessor, the
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, did in 1981.
Nevertheless, the conservative government rejected the advice and
enacted the CJPOA in 1994, thus making the right to silence

abolitionist, however, maintains that the abolishment of the right to silence without
adequate countervailing measures is excessive although he has long argued that there is
little to support the privilege against self-incrimination and its offshoot, the right to
silence.

See A.A.S. ZUCKERMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, ch. 15

(1989).
297. See id
29& See id.
299. See id at 719-20; EASTON, supra note 274, at 33.
300. See 'Enormous' Increase in Use of Right to Silence, POLICE REVIEW, at 285
(1988); HOME OFFICE, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE RIGHT OF SILENCE,

at 60-62 (1989).
301. Dixon, supra note 171, at 41 (emphasis in original).
302.

See HOME OFFICE, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE RIGHT OF

SILENCE, paras. 65, 86, 114. The proposed new caution states:

You do not have to say anything. A record will be made of anything you do say
and it may be given in evidence. So may your refusal to answer any question. If
there is any fact on which you intend to rely in your defence in court it would be
best to mention it now. If you hold it back until you go to court you may be less
likely to be believed.
Id. at para. 71.
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nominal in England.303 Some of the results of the CJPOA are
discussed below.
First, as of April 1995, both the prosecution and the judge are
permitted to comment unfavorably about a defendant's silence or
failure to mention a relevant fact during police questioning. 3° 4
Second, the court and the prosecution may comment unfavorably
on a defendant's failure to testify and provide evidence in the
courtroom. 305 Third, the court and the prosecution may invite the
jury to draw adverse inferences from the defendant's failure,
during police interrogation, to give a satisfactory explanation for
marks or substances (such as scuff marks on his shoes or blood on
his shirt). 306 Lastly, the court or prosecution may invite the jury to
draw adverse inferences from a suspect's failure to give a
satisfactory explanation to police questions about his presence at
the crime scene. 307 As a result, the Interrogation Code adopts a
new caution: "You do not have to say anything. But it may harm
your defense if you do not mention when questioned something
which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given
30 8
in evidence."
Even with academic arguments and empirical studies against
abolitionism, retentionism could not get effective political support.
The perspective was not a popular "vote-catcher. ' 309 Lawrence
Koffman stated:
The general public, fed on a remorseless diet of sensationalised
accounts of the growing rate of violence, 'mugging' and
burglaries, expects to hear more belligerent noises from
ambitious politicians. Quite simply there are far more votes to
be won by law and order policies than by support for civil
liberties. The latter can thus be comfortably dismissed as the

303. In 1996, there was another change in the Police Procedure and Investigations Bill.
The Bill requires a defendant tried in the crown court to give the prosecutor a "defence
statement" if the prosecutor has complied with the duty of prosecution disclosure. Clause
5 of the Bill says that the defense must disclose before the trial the nature of the defence,
the matters on which the defendant takes issue with the prosecution and the reasons. See
Zander, supra note 113, at 664-65.
304. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ORDER ACT, art. 34.
305. See id. art. 35.
306. See id. art. 36.
307. See id.
art. 37.
308. INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 111, at para. 10.4 (revised from Apr. 10,
1995) (emphasis added).
309. Koffman, supra note 47, at 15.
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310
rantings of extremists and intellectuals ....

C. The Court's Response
The strict restriction on the right to silence increased the
value of crime control value, but at the expense of due process.
The restriction indicates that the English criminal justice system is
shifting "from its accusatorial focus on proof by witnesses and
extrinsic evidence, to an inquisitorial focus on the interrogation of
suspects to gain evidence of their guilt."' 311 The restriction on the
right to silence shows that a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis can
destroy a common law right when a constitutional guarantee, such
as the United
States Bill of Rights, does not exist to protect that
312
right.
Hence, how have the English courts reacted to the
legislation? First, unlike the American courts, the English courts
do not have authority to declare an act of Parliament
unconstitutional because of the supremacy of Parliament. Because
the United Kingdom is a signatory of the European Convention on
Human Rights, judicial review of CJPOA is available through the
European Court of Human Rights. This judicial review is limited,
however, because neither the Convention nor the machinery of
adjudication are incorporated into the domestic United Kingdom
law. Therefore, judicial review of the CJPOA is unavailable to the
British people through proceedings brought in the United
313
Kingdom's ordinary courts.

310. Id.
311. Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Rights to Silence and Moves Towards an
InquisitorialSystem of Justice, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 402, 405 (1994).
312. In the United States, there have been proposals to allow adverse inferences from
silence. See DOJ REPORT No. 8, supra note 2, at 1005; Charles Maechling, Jr., Truth in
Prosecuting,Borrowing From Europe's Civil Law Tradition, A.B.AJ. 59, 60 (Jan. 1991).
The Supreme Court, however, has prohibited the inferences. See Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
313. See Lord Browne-Wilkinson, A Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom- The Case
Against, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 435, 436 (1997); John Mahoney, Suing the State: A
Comparisonof Remedies Providedfor Individual Rights Violations in GreatBritainand the
United States, 56 UMKC L. REV. 435, 449-53 (1988). For a discussion of relevant cases
from the European Commission on Human Rights and European Court on Human Rights,
see MIRFIELD, supra note 22, at 108-10. Regarding the debates on incorporating the
Convention into the statute law of the United Kingdom, see also MICHAEL ZANDER, A
BILL OF RIGHTS? (1997); Michael Zander, A Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom-Now,
32 TEX. INT'L L. J.441 (1997).
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In 1996, the European Court of Human Rights issued an
important decision that may affect the provisions of CJPOA. In
Murray v. United Kingdom,314 the Court considered the validity of
the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order, CJPOA's close
relative. The Northern Ireland Order allows a trial court to draw
adverse inferences from an accused's silence during interrogation
and at trial. In Murray, the defendant was arrested under the 1989
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act. At trial, the
judge drew inferences from the defendant's failure to answer
police questions and failure to testify at trial. The Court of Appeal
held that drawing adverse inferences from the defendant's silence
was a matter of common sense and could not be regarded as unfair
or unreasonable under the circumstances. 315 The European Court
of Human Rights held that a breach of Article 6 of the European
Convention, which guarantees those facing criminal charges "a fair
and public hearing," did not occur. Although the Court held that
the defendant's right to counsel had been violated for the first
forty-eight hours of his detention, in violation of Articles 6(3)(c)
and 6(1) of the Convention, it concluded that "reasonable
inferences" drawn from silence were permissible provided that the
national court did not base a conviction solely upon that silence. 316
Currently, two main English cases interpreted the provisions
of the CJPOA. 317 In the first case, Regina v. Argent, the Court of
Appeal prescribed six formal conditions that must be met before
the adverse inferences under Section 34 of CJPOA can be drawn.
The conditions are: (1) there must be a criminal proceeding
against the accused; (2) the accused must fail to 'mention a fact
when questioned but before he is charged; (3) the accused must be
questioned only after a caution is given by a constable or any other
person empowered by Section 34(4); (4) the questioning must
attempt to ascertain whether, or by whom, the alleged offense was
committed; (5) at trial, the accused must rely on the fact not
mentioned during the police questioning; and (6) in light of the
circumstances at the time of questioning, it must be reasonable to

314. See Murray v. United Kingdom, 97 Crim. App. 151, No. 41/1994/488/570 (1993);
see also Inferences from Silence and European Human Rights Law, CRIM. L. REV. 370
(1996).
315. See Murray, 97 Crim. App. 151 (1993).
316. Ia
317. Kevin Browne, An Inference of Guilt?, SOLICITORS J., (1997); Jonathan S.W.
Black, Inference from Silence: Redressing the Balance?, SOLICITORS J., Aug. 1, 1997.
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expect the accused to have mentioned the fact. 318
In the second case, Regina v. Cowan,319 the Court of Appeal
highlighted five essential instructions a judge must give a jury
under Section 35 of the CJPOA. They are: (1) the prosecution
always has the burden of proof; (2) the defendant is entitled to
remain silent; (3) an inference drawn from the accused's failure to
provide evidence cannot alone prove guilt; (4) the jury must be
satisfied that the prosecution established a case before drawing
any inferences from silence; and (5) the jury may draw an adverse
inference if, despite any evidence provided by the accused to
explain his silence or in the absence of such evidence, the jury
concludes the silence can only sensibly be attributed to the accused0
32
having no answer or none that would survive cross-examination.
Despite these guidelines, defendants who exercise a right to
silence and attorneys who advise their clients to exercise the right
still encounter difficulties. The new provision in the Interrogation
Code is a very complicated enigma for defendants. One concern is
that "[t]he new law [CJPOA] could prompt false confession by
weak suspects and erroneous convictions of those who, although
innocent, failed to offer a cogent explanation for their behavior or
who became confused. ' 321 At the same time, Michael Zander
predicts that more sophisticated lawyers will advise their clients to
mention some facts which they previously may not have
322
mentioned.
CONCLUSION

The modern development of the English exclusionary rules
demonstrates that the English criminal justice system developed
independent of the European or American system. As in the
United States, however, the confrontation and compromise
between the crime control and due process values are inevitable in
England.
PACE gives the police an extended stop and search-andseizure power and provides suspects with crucial rights during
police interrogations. PACE provides a national legislation to

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

THE TIMES, Dec. 19, 1996.
See Regina v. Cowan, 3 W.L.R. 818 (1995).
See id
O'Reilly, supra note 311, at 405.
See Zander, supra note 113, at 671; see also Browne, supra note 317, at 203.
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regulate the entire criminal process. The British Parliament
accomplished the very task that the United States Supreme Court
and numerous scholars requested of the United States Congress.
Although enactment of PACE did not automatically lead to a
behavioral change in police and suspects, it did provide a statutory
basis for the English courts to regulate police misconduct.
Furthermore, the English courts now frequently exercise their
discretionary power under PACE to exclude either confessional or
non-confessional physical evidence, obtained in violation of PACE
or the Codes of Practice.
In light of this trend, the "conservative" proposal3 23 in the
United States to eliminate Mapp and Massiah, according to the prePACE English rule, overlooks the recent dynamic change in
England. The ramifications of the three American exclusionary
rules are no longer alien to England. The official and explicit
abolition of the right to silence in Great Britain provides eyeopening comparative support in favor of the "conservative"
arguments. It would be extremely difficult, however, to propose the
abolishment of exclusionary rules in the United States because of
the Bill of Rights.
The British solution seems attractive to many American
scholars, although the serious impairment by the CJPOA of the
right to silence is troublesome. It is ironic that the American
experience inspired the exclusionary rules in the English criminal
justice system and now the English experience provides a potential
solution to the United States system. The question remains,
however, whether the United States Congress can adopt the English
324
solution.

323. See DOJ REPORT No. 1, supra note 2, at 535-36; No. 2, at 618.
324. It is argued that, in an era in which "virtually all politicians vie to out-posture one
another at law-and-order fear mongering." Thomas Y. Davies, Book Review: Craig M.
Bradley, The Failure of the CriminalProcedure Revolution, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 279, 283
(1996), the legislation of the alternatives to remedy police misconduct are "technically
feasible" but "politically unfeasible." Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure
and Constitutional Law: "Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REV.
1559, 1618 (1996) (emphasis in original). Anthony G. Amsterdam also stated:
Legislatures have not been, are not now, and not likely to become sensitive to
the concern of protecting persons under investigation by the police. Even if our
growing crime rate and its attendant mounting hysteria should level off, there
will remain more than enough crime and fear of it in America society to keep
our legislatures from the politically suicidal undertaking of police control.
Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 37879 (1974).

